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A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The imp'ortance of the study.--Religion is a vital
subject. This dissertation either makes a contribution to
the study of the psychology of religion, or else it is a
waste of time trifling with a very vital subject. There
are various phases of the psychology of religion such as
the origin of religion; the phenomena connected with con-
version and religious revivals; with mysticism, spiritism,
occultism, ecstasy, and prophetism; with the subconscious,
faith-cure, Christian Science, etc.; the interconnection
of mind and body; and the growth of the religious conscious-
1ness" Most of these phases have received a great deal of
attention, while other phases have been neglected. Some
have written on what is known as the "religious instinct";
these have been largely concerned with the question as to
whether the tendency to be religious springs from an innate
instinct or whether that tendency is acquired. However,
hardly any up-to-date writer holds the view that the dis-
IStanley A. Cook, "Religion," Encyclopedia of Reli-
fion and Ethics (abbr. HERE), ed, Ja."1lesHastings, Vol. X
1919), p, 668.
1
2position to be religious springs from ,an innate instinct.l
This dissertation deals with that disposition as an acquired
sentiment. The writer has become convinced, as a result of
investigation, that the study of "the religious sentiment"
(as acquired) has been neglected and that there is need of
giving it a great deal of consideration. The importance of
this study may be sunwarized in three statements: (1) Reli-
gion is always a vital subject and, in the last generation,
"has attracted increasing attention.,,2 (2) The attention
given by McDougall to religion was subsidiary to his deal-
3ing with sociology, and so there is need of its being made
the subject of study with sociology as subsidiary. (3)
There is great confusion in the religious world as to the
nature, origin, and function of religion,4 and a study of
the religious sentiment has brought to light a better under-
standing of these phases of religion.
IJames Bissett Pratt, The Religious C~sciousness:
A Psychological study (new York: The Macmillan Co., 1930),
pp. 691'1'.
2Cook, "Religion," HERE, X, 662.
3
Vim. McDougall, "The Instincts through which Religious
Conceptions Afi'ect Social Life, II An Introduction to Social
Psycho~ (Boston: John VY. Luce & Co., 1921), chap. x LLd ,
pp. 309-328.
4James He Leuba, "The Nature of Religion," !
Ps cholo ical Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and
Future New York: The r..lacmillan Co., 1912), Part I, pp. 1-
54; ibid., "Definitions of Religion and Critical Comments,1I
ibid., appendix, pp. 339-363.
1- -----~------~--------~--
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The problem of this study ..--The question is not so
much whether the religious sentiment springs from an innate
instinct or is acquired, but how it is acquired and how it
1is developed. And there is considerable disagreement as
to the composition of religion, as to whether it is largely
intellectual or emotional or volitional; this seriously in-
volves the composition of the religious sentiment. But cer-
tain of the more up-to-date scholars deal with religion as
including all three of the mental processes--the intellect,
i d h lOtO 2the eTI10tons, an t e vo 1 10ns. This is the view which
the writer holds and which he sets forth in this disserta-
tion. Then, there is the problem of analyzing the I"eligious
sentiment. Just as McDougall analyzed the sentiments of man
from the standpoint of sociology, so this dissertation is an
analysis of the sentiments of a person from the standpoint
of religion. That is, the same psychological principles
which McDougall applied to the study of sociology have been
3applied to the study of religion.. However, the problem of
this dissertation is not hO"1 to prove that religion is an
acquired sentiment involving the whole mind, but how best
to present the facts that have come to light in this study
lIkDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 309.
2Thomas Hywell Hughes, Psychology of Religious
Origins (New York: Charles SCI"ibner's Sons, 1937), pp. 98f.;
Pratt, ReI. ~. (1930), pp. 2f.
'7Vf;IcDougall,Soc. Psy ..
4in such a way as will be most userul to those who are con-
cerned with developing people into Christ-like characters.
The source of information for the study.--Because of
the influence of schola.rs over each other, the works which
have been used in the proparation of this dissertation should
be considered, for the most part, in the order in which they
appeared. James' Principles of PS¥Cholo[!,xlappeared in 1890;
then he abridged it and published it in 1894 in one volume
2entitled simply Psychology. He says that there are many
instincts and emotions;3 but McDougall, in his Social Psy-
ch01ogy,4 first published in 1908, says that there are few.5
McDougall based his analysis of the sentiments on Shand's
articleG published shortly before in Mind. Then Shand wrote
7his Foundations of Character, which appeared in 1914, and
in wh.l.chhe quotes McDougall's Social Psychology on the sen-
lWm. -Iames..Principles of PSYCholOg~ ("American
Science Series: Advanced Course"; 2 vols., \few York: Henry
Holt & Co., 1890).
2Wm. James, Psychology ("American Science Series:
Briefer Course"; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1893).
'Z
vlbid., pp. 373ff.
4Wm• McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology,
(Boston: John W. Luce & Co., 1921).
5Ibid., pp. 20ff.
6Alexander F. Shand, lICharacter and the E.motions,"
lUnd, N.S., Vol. V., referred to in footnote and commented
on in text by l!IcDougall,Soc. Psy., p. l26f.
7Alexander Shand, The Foundations of Character
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1920).
5timents. 1Finally, McDougall wrote his Outline of Psychology
and published it in 1922. Further, the writer has observed
that various writers quote McDouga L'l., especially his Social
Psychology. Some of these are: Coe (1916), Selbie (1923),
Edward (1926), Thouless (1927), stout (1929), Pratt (1930),
and Hughes (1937). There are others, of course, 'who quote him;
these were chosen largely at random, but Coe, Stout, and Pratt
were purposely selected. So far as the writer has observed in
his examination of these other sources, none of their authors
added much toward the improvement of the theory as presented
by TllcDougalland Shand. They follow McDougall very closely,
as the writer has done in this dissertation. Besides these
works dealing with the sentiments, Leuba's A Psychological
Study of Religion,2 Pratt's The Religious Consciousness,3
and Hughes' Psychology and Religious Origins4 have largely
'i'urnished the infor;mation :for arriving at a de:finition of
religion. Other sources oi'ini'ormation have been recognized
in the appropriate places.
IVlm. McDougall, Outline of Psychology (new York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923).
2James H. Leuba, A Psrcholo~ical Stud of ReliGion:
Its Origin, Function, and Future 1ew York: 'I'he il acmillan
Co., 1912).
3James Bissett Pratt, The Religious Consciousness:
A PsycholOGical Study (New York: 1'heI.IacmillanCo,, 1930).
4Thomas Hywe Ll,Hughes, PsycholoGY and Religious
Oric;ins (Hew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937).
6The title of the studX.--It is called A Study in the
PsycholoGY of the Religious Sentiment. It suggests the main
divisions in the dissertation: the term "study" suggests
chapter i; the term "psychologyl1 suggests chapter ii; the
term "religious" suggests chapter iii; and the expression
"religious sentiment" suggests chapter iv. These four chap-
ters with the concluding chapter make up the whole. A more
detailed analysis of the study has been left to the next section.
The study itself.--The first chapter, of course, is
introductory to the subject. The second chapter is devoted
to the definition of a person and an analysis of his mind or
consciousness. This analysis is the main part of chapter ii
and is the foundation on which the study of the religious
sentiment rests; hence, instincts, emotions, and especially
sentiments have been discussed in considerable detail in the
analysis of a person's feeling, while his thinking and will-
ing have not received as much attention. The third chapter
has been devoted to the definition of the religious person
and his religion. The definition of religion has been arrived
at only after an examination of three classes of definitions
of religion. This classification of definitions was made on
the basis of whether their authors define religion as largely
intellectual or enlotional or volitional. Then the definition
of religion is given as including all three--the intellect,
the emotions, and the will. The fourth chapter is an analysis
of the religious sentiment. This chapter is largely an analy-
7sis of the sentiment of Love for God, the Father. Two short
sections are devoted to faith and hope. Finally, in the
fifth chapter the whole study is s~umnarized in order to get
a bird's eye view of what has been accomplished.
The field of the study.--From the above discussion
of the subject of this study, it is readily seen that this
dissertation is limited to the field of psychology_ Further,
since the \'J'!'iter is not concerned with the origin of the 'men-
tal processes and their function in creating the true, the
beautiful, and the good, this dissertation is limited to an
analysis of the mental processes as organized into sentiments,
especially the religious sentiment. It is based on the theory
of sentiments as set forth by Shand and Iy1cDougall, and it is
limited to the introspectionist's view and method of approach.
A great deal is said in the present day about applying
the scientific spirit and method to religion. Since religion
is definitely a mental phenomenon, it belongs rightly to the
field of psychology. The application of the psychological
method to the study of reliGion in this dissertation is there-
fore in keeping with the modern attitude as expressed by many
scholars. So far as the writer has been able to determine, he
knows of no other work that approaches the study of the
religious sentiment in just the way he has approached it in
this study. He considers the study of the religious sentiment
a ve~y timely topic and submits this dissertation to the reader,
leaving it to his judgment as to vlhether it does justice to
the subject.
CHAPTER II
PERSON
Introductory
Preliminary statement.--The introductory portion of
this chapter is devoted to defining the terms "person" and
IImind" and the rest of the chapter to an analysis of mInd.
This is necessary to the proper understanding of the,nature
and composition of the religious sentiment.
Deflni tion of a Eerson.- No-If an average person were
asked the question, "'v'Jhatis a per-sonv " he most likely would
say, ttaman," or Iiahuman being~1I This is true, but it is
not quite definite enough for the present purpose. To be
more definite, a person is defined as a self-c?nscious, self-
direct.lng organism who directs his activity toward his ovm
apparent good. He is a spirit. He is conscious in that he
thinks, feels, and vlills; but further, as a spirit he is self-
conscious in that he knows that he thinks, feels, and wills--
thus, he has a mind and knows his own mind. By saying that
he is an organism, his body is included. And, to satisfy the
theologian, his soul is included in his constitution as life,
mind, or spirit, according to different views. He inherits
certain mental abilities; others he acquires. He is self-
directing in that he directs his own activity; this is toward
8
r"-1-'-:--"- - -:..- --.~.... ----
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1his ovm apparent good or self-development, as Plato and
others have said. However, if one wishes to ask any person
about this, that person will say, IISurely, I am looking out
for Number One.1I This attitude may seem somewhat selfish,
but it is characteristic of the average man. These brief
remarks should make clear what is contained in the above
2definition.. The rest is limited to a study of his mind.
Definition of mind.--Mind is best defined by what it
does. If one ask another vrhat his mind is, he will very likely
say that it is his thinkinc; but if he is questioned further,
he may say that it is his thinking, feeling, and willing. He
is right; with his mind he thinks, feels, and wills. Mind and
consciousness are practically synonymous. Mind, therefore, is
de.fined as the whole complex process of mental activity, com-:.
posed of thinkin~, feeling,_and willing, de~ived from inherited
abilities and contact with environment, develoEed throu@~ use,
and used .for one' s ovm self-betterment. The way has now been
prepared 1'01" an analysis of each of these three processes of
3the mind. Tne next section is an analysis of his thirucing.
l"'VilliamDe Witt Hyde, "The Platonic Subordination
of Low-er to Higher, II From ~urus to Christ: A Study in
the Principles of Personality (New York:" "The Macmillan ce .,
1904), chap. iii, pp. 110-168.
2nperson,tI Webster's New International Dictionari[:
(abbr. Web. New Int~ict:), 1940.
3"~and, IIVleb. New Int. Dict.; IIMind,II A Dictionary
of the Bible (abbr. HDB), ed. James Hastings (Uew York:
Oharles Scribner's Sons, 1899), III (1919),374.
Ae Analysis of His Thinking
1. Productive Thinking
Producing thought.-- Thoughts about the external
world are produced, not merely by perceiving, but by conceiv-
ing the objects that make up the external world. "Perceiving
f ° ° "Iis one mode 0 concelvlng. But these two activities of the
mind need to be considered separately.
Perceiving.-- This activity of the mind is the simplest,
most elementary kind of thinking.2 It is taking knowledge of' 'II
ceiving as one mode of'conceiving. IITo know , to recognize,
the objects of' experience, whether these objects ar-e present
to the senses or absent f'rom thenlbut present to the mind as
ideas of the actual objects. A boy's puppy at home is to the
boy at school just as real in his thinking about it as if' it
were actually present to his senses, though not as vivid in
his mind as if it were present to his senses.
Conceiving.--This activity of the mind includes per-
to be aware of, or conscious of', any object is to conceive it,
even when our knowledge is a perceptual knowing. To mean an
bI tit ° °t 113o Jec s 0 concelve l • Perceptive thinking requires
either an actual object or the idea of'it to make thinking
lMcDougall, Outline of'Psy., p. 254.
2Ibid., p. 253. 3Ibid., p. 254.
10
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possible--that is, it requires that all objects and ideas be
concrete. Conceptive thinking is possible, whether the ideas
are concrete or abstract. A concrete idea is a mental image
of a concrete object; an abstract idea is the name of a class
of concrete objects, that is, the class as a whole is conceiv-
ed in the same way as one object of the class is perceived. A
single object can also be conceived as made of different parts,
and yet it can be perceived as one object. Thoughts are pro-
duced by perceiving and conceiving objects or ideas of objects.
2. Reproductive Thinking
Reproducing thought.-- Thoughts about the external
world can be reproduced through remembering and imagining the
same objects perceived in the past. As they are remembered
they are created or reproduced just as they were perceived or
conceived the first time they were experienced. But these
activities of the mind are better' discussed separately.
Remembering.--This activity of the mind has already
been implied in part. In order to recall objects absent from
the senses, one must be able to retain in his thinking ideas
formed of objects previously perceived when present to the
senses. Retaining these ideas, recreating the images of the
objects at the will to recall them, and then recognizing them
as the same images made in the presence of the objects--these
three activities of the mind consist of what is called re-
membering.
12
Imagining.--This activity of the mind, too, has
already been implied in its simplest form. An object present
to the senses can be perceived only by forming an image of it
in the mind; likewise, an object absent from the senses can
be perceived in the mind only by recalling to the mind the
image previously made--creating it in the same way that it was
created the first time. It is through this process of making
mental images that the boy is able to imagine his puppy at
home. But the various images thus created can be combined to
make other images, either partly new or wholly new. There
are two kinds of creative thinking: fancying or purposeless
thinking and constructive or purposeful thinking. This
creative activity of the mind is more complex than merely per-
ceiving simple objects, since it is a reconstruction of' the
simple percepts into new objectS. Whether simple percepts and
simple concepts are created in the presence or in the absence
of the objects, the process of imagining is the same. A man
may stand in front of hiS house and imagine how it would appear
with a new coat of paint. Remembering is reproductive think-
ing; imagining is both productive and reproductive.
3. Intuitive Thinldng and Understanding
Intuitive thinkina---This activity of the mind is im-
mediately perceiving the reality of things directly witllout
1
. 1ana yzing or reason1ng.
Such thinking, if the person were
lUIntuition," Web. New Int- Dict.
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capable of'no other kind, would be only a series of'discon-
nected reals. A child burns his hand on the stove and per-
ceives intuitively that the stove burns. He repeats the act
several times before reasoning that hot stoves are not to be
touched. A succession of'disconnected intuitive truths would
never give organized knowledge.
Understanding.--This activity of the mind is conceiv-
ing the truth of things through analyzing and reasoning about
things. It is apprehending and comprehending truth.l
Apprehending is the activity of the mind catching the meaning
of'a part of', or the whole of, a situation as a unit, either
2by chance or by purposely giving attention to it. Comprehend-
ing is the activity of' the mind seizing or taking in many or
all of'the details of any situation, or of' several situations,
together, as to f'orm a whole.3 These require an analytic and
synthetic mind, f'or, without such a mind, no one could under-
stand anything. Situations and objects in them are analyzed
into parts; then, these parts are synthesized by reorganizing
l"Understanding, "
2"Apprehending,"
3 ""Comprehending,
Web. New Int. Dict.
Ibid.
Ibid.
and combining into new ideas of things. Analysis involves
discriminating between likes and dislikes; synthesis involves
association of'likes into classes and dislikes into classes.4
4James, "Discrimination," and "Association," Psy.,
chaps.xv and xvi, pp. 244-279; McDougall, "Growth of'Mental
Structure," Outline of'Psy., chap ..xv, pp. 378-398.
14
vVhen statements are formed about these, judgments are formed.
1
Knowledge is composed of judgmentse
3e Judging and Reasoning
Judging.--This activity of the mind is affirming or
denying statements of thought. Vmen certain knowledge is
available, it is the affirming and denying what is true or
false; when only probably knowledge is available; it is the
affirming of what is believed or denying what is not believed.
In case of doubting judgment is suspended.
2
Reasoninge--This activity of the mind is the most com-
plex kind of thinking. Reasoning is a process of com'bining
judgments or propositions already known or believed to be true.
It originates in the thinking, as may be inferred from what
has been said above, and develops by passing frorn the proposi-
tions, in order, to the conclusion, which is the result of
comparing the judgments used in the argument. The validity
of the conclusion depends on reasoning correctly from true
propositions. In forming the conclusion, either new knowledge
is obtained, or old knowledge is validated. In the former,
statements are.postulated and reasons are found to validate
these statements, which then become conclusions. In the lat-
ter, when a statement is challenged, reasons are sought to
IFrank Thilly, A Histor_y_of Philosoph.:;y_(New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1914);=PP· 3~9~402.
2IVIcDougall,outli~e of Psx-, pp. 3671'1'.;3991'.
15
validate it. But there are many self-evident truths that
are known intuitively and need no proof. These are the basis
on which all valid arguments are formed. All correct reason-
lng from these gives certain knowledge, and reasoning is de-
pendent on understanding and judgment.l
summary.--Through perceiving, remembering, imagining"
apprehending" comprehending, and understanding all ideas are
acquired.. They are formed by concel vLng , judging, and y-<;ason-
ing. All thinking is analyzing, comparing, and synthesizing.
Conceptive thinking is comparing and contrasting ideas and
forming concepts. Judging is comparing and contrasting con-
cepts and forming judgments, thus producing knowledge. Reason-
ing is comparing and contrasting judgments and forming proofs,
thus increasing knowledge. Knowledge is composed of jUdgments.
Transition.--The above summary completes this section
and gives a comprehensive view of a person's intellect or
thinking. The next section is an analysis of his emotions or
feelings. It is the most important section in this chapter.
1
James, "Reasonlng,1I ~., chap.xXii,pp.351",,369;
McDougall, "Reasoning and the System of'Beliefs," Outline of
~., chap. xvi, pp. 399-416.
A. Analysis of His Feelings
1. Sensations and Feelings Proper
Sensing.--This activity of the mind is perceiving
through the special senses and in a general manner. The
special senses are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and
the varieties of touching; perceiving in a general manner
includes what is known as "common bodily 1'eeling" or coen-
asthesia--a class of general feelings such as weariness,
hunger, sickness, nausea, etc.--as well as those peculiar
feelings resulting from bodily changes tllat accompany the
emotions--e.g .., accompanying anger are feelings resulting
from flushed face, tension of muscles, etc., and accompanying
fear are feelings resulting from shivering, shuddering, etc.
Feelings proper.--In general, 1'eelings may be loosely
spoken of as including sensations, feelings proper, desires,
emotions, and sentiments. But feelings proper must always
be carefully dis·t;inguishedfrom sensations, desires, emotions,
and sentiments. And it is better to reserve the term feeling
to refer only to those pleasant or unpleasant (agreeable or
disagreeable, et~) affects of sensations which are classed
as either pleasure or pain. To illustrate: the tasting of
sugar results in a sweet sensation and an agreeable feeling
and the desire for more of the sweet sensation; the smelling
of flowers results in a fragrant sensation and an agreeable
16
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feeling and the desire for more of the fragrant sensation;
the burning of the hand on a stove results in a burning
sensation and a disagreeable feeling and the aversion to
. t. 1any more burnlng sensa-lon; etc. Feelings do not pr-oduce
emotions; emotions are merely accompanied by agreeable or
disagreeable feelings. Feelings must, therefore be care-
fully distinguished from emotions and sentiments.2
2. Instincts and Emotions
Definition of instinct.--This is an innate or in-
born disposition to purposeful action to obtain a desired
end; it is inherited and so not acquired by learning. It
seems to be a blind impulse that attains its goal without
h 1 h . t·t··t t 3t~e earning ow prevlous 0 1 S lncl emen • McDougall
has this to say:
Vie may therefore define "an instinct" as an innate
disposition which determines the organism to perceive
(to pay attention to) any object of a certain class,
and to experience in its presence a certain emotional
excitement and an impulse to action which finds ex-
pression in a specific mode of behavior in relation
to that object.~
IT/IcDougall,Outline of Psy., pp. 19lf, 347ff; -James,
~., pp. 392ff., 389f.
2James VJard, "Psychology," Ency. Brit. , 11th ed, XXI-
XXII, 55lf.; cf. W.B. Selbie, The Psychology of Religion,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), p. 41, footnote.
3McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp.70f.,109f.,118ff.;
"The Nature of Instincts and Their Place in the Constitution
of the Human fUnd," Soc. Ps:[.,chap.ii, pp.20-46;James, ~.,p.39l.
4McDougall, Outline of Psy.,p.llOjcf. his Soc.~.,p.30.
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While an instinct may control action as definitely
as intelligence, it is below the level of intellieence; in-
stinctive action must be distinguished also from ref'lexive
action. Instincts are inherited by the child, begin above
the level of reflex actions, and are modified both by intel-
ligence a.nd by habit.l The following table is based largely
on McDougall's tables in his Outline of Psycholoe;y.2
TABLE I
tHSTl.NCTS AND PRIN1AKY IDWTIOI~S
Name of the
ACCO!!lDi),nyingEmotlon
lq-ameof Obj ect
Inciting ItName of theInstinct Resul tin.<r-Action ""
--------------------4---------------"--- --------------r--------------
~ugnacity (combat)
Escape (.flight)
Curiosity
Re:pulsion
Self-a~randizement
Self-submission
Mating instinct
Enemy
Danger
Strane~e
Distastefu.l
Self
Self
Opp osi te sex
AnGer
Fear
Wonder
Di St~ust
Elat.if)n
Meeknesn
Lust (.:;ood)
Inj ur-e , flee
Flee trom it
App.r oac h it;
Put it aside
As sert self
Sub:nit self
In terco ur-s e
Social instinct
Parental instinct
Lau~hter (smiling)
Appeal (to others)
Constr1lction
Food- seekin~
Acquisition
Prodigality
Others (ofkind)
Weak, off-spring
Wit , fun , j oke
Pain, need
Things
Food
'I'hIngs, money
Thin~s, money
Sociability
Tenderness
Am uacm en t
Di s tr-e s s
Craft-feelint;
CravinG
'.Vant
Gift-feeling
.Join Group
Care for it
La ug'h, sm.iLe
Cry, beG
M'ake thin~3
Hunt food
Hoa:xrti,get
Gi ve it aWEW
Sympathy (for others Distress, need Love
Suggestibility suggestion Satisfaction
Imi tation Another's action Uni ty-feelinr:
Help
Do as told
Imitate
____________ • -4. ~ ~ _
~ffcDoueall, Outline of Ps~., pp. 70f., 74-81, 87-93.
2McDou;:;all,_outline of Psy., pp •. 394, :352; cf. his Soc.
Pay , , pp. 20ff., chap. iii, pp , 47-92, chap. iv, pp. 93-124-.-
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Varieties of Lnet f.nct svv--j n the first column of Table
1 the first seven instincts are well defined and are specific;l
the next eight are not so Vlell defined, but they are specific.2
The 18,St three are general or non-specific instincts LnvoLvi.ng
the interaction of the minds of two or mor e persons.3 Each
instinct is incited in the presence of or at the thought of
one of a definite class of objects. Each instinct is accom~
panied by a definite emotion; and each instinct that is satis-
fied r eaul.ts in a definite set of actions; but, when it is
not satisfied its accompanying emotional stress is Greatly
increased instead of being released. In the latter case when
the condi tion is temporary it Ls called a temper, and when
the condition is continued it is called a mood. Instincts
vary in degree among different persons. One's temperarnent
is determined la.rgely by the proportionate strength, end uranc e,
and affectability from enviroruaent, of the different instincts
he Lnheri ts, Teml)erament is modified by the psycho-physical
changes that take place during his life.4 From these inher-
ited .inst i nct s come the emo tLcns that play so l2.rae a part
in the lives of people.
IMcDougall, Soc. Psy., DP. aorr , , 47~>f.
2Ibi d. , .DP. ZOffo. 47-92 •
3Ibid., pp. 20ff., 93-124.
4];1cDougall,Outline of Pay., pp , 351-361.
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]l,10tion.--Beloll'lare three statement which may be
termed as defini tions of an emotion. 'rae first is made by
the Encyclo_2edia Bri ttanica:
El,ITOTIOlT, a vivid f'e eLf.ng or state of exci tement
induced by the app renen sdon of some object which
arouses an instinctive reaction.}
James says:
An emotion is a tendency to feel, and an instinct
is a tendency to act, characteristically, when in the
presence of a certain object in the environment. But
the emotions also have their bodily "expression,"
which may involve strong muscular activity (as fear
or anger, for example); and it becomes a little hard
in many cases to separate the description of the
"emotionalil condition from that of the "instinctive"
r eac ttcn which one and the aame object may provoke ••
• • • As inner mental condi tions, emotions are qui te
indescribable ••••• Every object that excites an
Ln stLnc t excites an emotion as well.2
McDougall observes that
Each of the principal instincts conditions • • • •
some one kind of emotional excitement'Nhose quality
is specific or peculiar to it; a.nd the emotional
excitement of specific quality that is the affective
aspect of the operation of anyone of the principal
instincts may be called a primary emotion. 'rhis
principle • • • • proves to be of very sreat value
when we seek to analyze the complex emotions into
their primary constituents.3
Enotion, in its narrow sense-- that is, a. primary
emotion--rnay be defined, then, a.s vivid feelinG, a.san af-
fective constituent of consciousness, waich is indescribable
and which always accompanies the same instinctive reaction to
ll\EMOTION," Encyc. Brit., 14th ed;, VIII, 399.
2James, Ps;y_.,p , 373.
3McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 49.
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one or a class of objects, which is excited by apprehending
the same object, and which is the cause of changes both in
the body and its behaviour, sustaining the action as long
as atrt errt.Lon is focused on the object. It can be excited
either by perceiving or recalling (remembering) or imagining
the object apprehended.
1Varieties of emotions.--In general, there are two
classes of emotions: primary anc secondary or blended emo-
tions. The latter have not yet been discussed; the former--
emotions in the narrow sense--are those defined on the previous
page. Primary or elementary emotions are varieties of emo-
tional qualities or "qualitative varieties of emotional
experience.,,2 Each arises in the same way--that is by appre-
hending its own appropriate object while reacting instinctively
to that object. Secondary emotions are not, strictly speak-
ing, properly called emotions themselves, but are the blend-
ings of emotions. Each arises in its simples form when two
elementary emotions are excited by the same object. For
exrunple, Figure 1 (on next page) represents a man who perceives
a strange object that he does not fully apprehend at first,
which arouses, on the one hand, the instinct to flee and the
emotion of fear, and on the other hand, the instinct to
338.
1
McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 3l6f., 325f., 329-
2Ibid., p. 315.
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approach and the emotion 01' wonder; the result is that the two
opposing emotional 1'orces cause him, neither to approach in won-
der nor to 1'lee in fea~ but to stand stil~ fascinated. Fascina-
tion is the blending of two emotions: fear and wonder. No object
will directly excite fascination, but the blending of excited
emotions will produce it. This illustrates what is true of'
TIlany of the primary emotions. See the figures given in chapter
OBJECT
(Something Strange)
FIGURE I
THE BLENDED EMOTION OR SENTIMENT OF FASCINATION
In this figure, I represents the intellectual 1'actor;
E', the emotional factor; V, the volitional factor; E", the
emotion aroused by the object; and S the sentiment resulting
from the blending of emotions.
..
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1 Primary emotions do not always blend; but when blend-i v ,
ings do take place, the seconlary emotions function to sus-
tain action just as primary emotions but in a stronger degree
and for a longer time. When there is marked conflict and
failure to harmonize, all emotions are eliminated except one
tha t becomes dominant; but, i:"'they har-mondze, they blend to
form compound or secondary emotions. A secondary or blended
emotion already acquired may have an emotion blended with it
and increase its complexity. Thus, complex emotions, better
called sentiments, are formed in varying degrees of complexlty.
Derived emotions.--McDougall makes a distinction between
secondary and derived emotions. Such emotions as joy, sorrow,
regret, remorse, surprise, hope, despair, anxiety, and peace
do not seem to belong in either the class of primary emotions
or the class of blended emotions. McDougall says of this
peculiar group of feelings:
Hone of these can be shown by an analytical
introspection to be a blend of any two or more of
the primary emotional qualities. Nor do they con-
form to the type of the primary emotion. FOl> it is impos-
sible to point out anyone instinctive impulse vii th
which anyone of these "emotions" is constantly con-
joined, as anger with the impulse of aggression, fear
wi th the impulse of escape, curiosity with the Inmulse
to dr-aw near and examine ••• " The best Vie can do • "
• " is to speak of •• "2" a third distinct class, that
of the derived emotions.
While these facts may be true, it seems that because
Icr , p , 75.
2
McDougall, Outline of Psy., p. 338.
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of the complexity of this third class of feelings, they must
be really secondary emotions so complex that no psychologist
has yet analyzed them; and if they were analyzed, they might
be found to be blended emotions. They are aroused by the ap-
prehension of an object just as do the blended emotions. For
the purpose of this dissertation they will be considered in
the same way as the blended emotions, whether they are such
or not. In general, they may be classed according to whether
they are prospective (e.g., confidence, hope, anxiety, des-
pondancy, and despair) or retrospective (e.g., regret, remorse,
sorrow, chagrin, and grief).l
Transition.-- It is seen that feelings are to be clas-
sified as pleasant or unpleasant (pleasure and pain); that
these accompany the emotions, both primary and secondary; that
emotions blend so as to build up a complex system of emotional
reactions, which are called sentiments in the next topic.
3. Sentiments, Attitudes, and Ideals
Sentiment.--Emotions are blended only when thinking
and willing control the coni'licting emotional experiences ..
The intellectual factor in a sentiment is determined by ap-
prehending the object of experience and reasoning about it;
IIbid., pp. 338-343 ..
the volitional factor is determ~ned by attending to the object
and choosing the proper course of action; and the emotional
25
factor is determined by the results of thinking and willing.
But when once a sentiment is formed, it sustains the action ,
initiated by the will under control of the intellect. When
several emotional disPositions (or emotions) are combined in
1
one system, this is called a sentiment. The Encyclopedia
Brittanica observes that a sentiment is:
a constellation or system of emotional dispositions
related to one person or object. Lo~e, friendship
t· t ,and reverence, e.g., are sen lmen s.
A Dictionary of Psychology states that sentiment is:
an emotional disPosition which has reference to an
object, person, or abstract idea'nand lacks the
characteristic of a true emotion.0
The characteristic that it laclcshas already been noted
to be the inherited tendency of an emotion; in contrast to
this, a sentiment is dependent upon the blending of emotions.
It cannot be excited innately by the object, but it is ex-
cited emotionally by the object. McDougall agrees with the
two definitions above, when he says:
We have seen that a sentiment is an organized
system of emotional diSPositions centred about the
idea of some object. The organization of the senti-
ments in the developing mind is determined by the
course of experience; that is to say, the sentiment
is a growth in the structure of the mind that is not
IMcDOUga11, "Nature of the Sentiments,ll Soc. Psy ••chap. v, pp. 125; Shand, ~und ..of Char., pp. 20-27.
21lSentiment,1!~cyc ..Brit., XX, 331.
C.
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natively given in the inherited constitution.
l
A sentiment, then, may be defined as an organized
unit of conscious activity, composed of emotional disposi-
tions (consisting of intellectual, emotional, and volitional
factors), derived from the blending of these emotional dispo-
sitionsby the mind, developed by blending in more emotional
dispositions, strengthened through repetition, and function-
ing as the sustainer of activity toward the goal or object'
around 'which the system is organized. Two synonyms are at-
titude and ideal. They need to be defined before considering
sentiments further.
Atti tud_S?.__Atti tude and sentiment are often used
interchangeably. But attitude is really the broader of the
two terms. One may assume almost any physical attitude; it
is clear that the term sentiment would not apply to all such
attitudes. An attitude is "a readiness to respond in a def-
inate way to social stimuli of a general or specific characterl,2
In a general sense, attitude may be used to comprise all of
one's sentiments, as one'S general attitude toward life; or
it may include only those sentiments that c:lusterabout some
object, as one's attit~e to.~d God; and frequently, it is
nothing more than a synonym for sentlment. But because the
IMcDougall, .§.oc.psy., p. 164.
2 IIAttitude, II Qict. of Psy., p. 24.
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organization in the mind as a unit of consciousness is the
same for anyone of the three--sentiment, attitude, or ideal
-Jthese three terms have been considered the same and have,
at times, been used as synonyms.
Ideal.--'Vnile an ideal is the same as a sentiment
when considered as a unit of consciousness, a.n ideal may also
become the object of a sentiment; then, it is considered as
a perfect or superior goal to be striven for, and the eenti-
ment toward that goal is the actual condition of the mlnd at
any time during one's development toward che ideal.1 The term
"ideal" is "more commonly used to denote that which is perfect
or supreme of its kind,,;2 or, "an emotionally colored repre-
sentation of some future line of behavior or situation as de-
sirable, though scarcely attainable.,,3 The only difference
in these two statements is one of degree of the completeness
or perfection of the ideal; they express the senses in which
the term has been used in this dissertation.
Desire.--Desire is neither a sentiment, nor an ideal.
nor an attitude, nor an emotion.4 It seems that the term
"desire" has never been accurately defined; each psychologist
has his ovm conception of its meaning. NrcDoue;allused this
lShand, Foundations of Character, pp. 112f.
2l1Ideal," Encyc. Brit., 14th ed.. XII, 65.
3"Ideal," Dict. of Psy., p. 129.
4Shand , Foundations of Character, pp. 460-463.
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expression apparently as synonymous to the term "desire":
"the thought of the desired end."l In this expression,
IIt no ht " . t 11 t 1 ltd . ... . t',,11/]; as In e ec ua.i., es~re as emo tonat , and "end"
is purposeful or volitional. Desire is any emotional con-
elition V'Ji th thought and purpose, but not an emotion or a
sentiment. Shand illustrates desire thus: lilt is 'desire'
when, having been separated from one we love, we feel an im-
pulse toward reunion, and have a thought of this reunion as
d.istinct from all that we may be accomplishing to effect it. ,,2
Star,;esof ggwth of a sentiment.-_Shand gives two
stages in the development of a sentiment:
Whili~the first freshness of a sentiment its virtues
often develop in this spontaneous way • • • • yet a lit-
tle later these qualities are often cheched; and effort
and reflection succeed the first stage of spontaneous
growth. • • • • ~nce in all sentiments tbnt continue
to Irow or even to main~in themselves,.- second stage
tends to occur in which we become consCl0US of their
qualities, and reflect on them, and strive after them
with effort. because we recognlze toat these quallties
are in dang~r of not advancin, with the «rowth add needs
of the sentiment, or even fallin3 away. From this cause
arise the IdealS of a sentlment.
The growth of a scnthnent may be considered alsO as
passing through _J;hre2.stages in its development: the tulre-
flective spontaneous stage, ~e reflective stage of discovery,
and the refl ecti ve stage of st riving aft er "Ideal s. ,!4
--------.--------------------------lMCDOUg
all
, §£S. ~., p. 076; cf. his Outline of Ps~.,
207, 313. -
2Shand, .E0undat~ of Characte,;:,p. 460.
4Ibid., P .112f.
'Pp.
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Varieties of sentLll.ents.--Ingeneral, there are three
ay s t em s of sentiments: hate, love, and respect.1 T\[cDou~all
says:
Besides the sentiments of the ae three main types,
love, hate, and respect, vlhich we :p:ustcall complete or
fUll-grown 'sentiments, we may recognize the existence
of sentiments of all degrees of development from the
most rudimentary upward; these may be regarded as stages
in the formation of fully grov'ffisentiments, although
may of th~m never attain any degree of complexity or
stren~th.""
Sentiments may be classified in another way. They
are characterized by repulsion or attraction, according as
the person is repulsed or attra.cted by the object , 'Phis has
been illustrated in the blended ~notion or sentiment of fas-
cination CFig. 1 above). 3 Hate and Lo ve also illustrate this.
Transition.--It has been decided best to defer any
detailed discussion of the various sentiments until chapter
iv when considerine the religious sentiment, when those that
make up the system of love and hate will be described. It
should be noted also that while the vo i t t i ons have been con-
sidered in describing the intellectual processes as activities
and in describing instinctive act i.on, volitions have been left
for discussion in the next section of this chapter. It was
necessary to introduce the person's willing in order to accu-
rate1y describe h:Ls thinking and feeling; Ldkewi ae , it is also
necessary to consider his thinkinG and feeling with his willing.
IJ,[cDbugall,Soc. Fsy., pp. 164-170.
2~., :p. 167. ;5Cf• n- 22.
C. Analysi~ of His Willing
1. InvolUlltary and Voluntary Action
Involuntary action.--There are two kinds of react-
ing in wh Lch there 5.3 no influence of the intellect nperati ve;
these are automatic (e.g., heart-beat) and reflexes (e.g.,
1
bLLnk Lrig the eye}. .~third kind of reac ting is the instincts
discussed above.2 A certain measure of mental control is
exercised ovor these, and they also involve all or almost all
of the organism. A fourth kind of invohmtary reaction is
we LL developed habits, which have their origin not only in
instinctive action, but also in voluntary action. Habits
range all the way from voluntary to involuntary action.
3Voluntary action. --James gives gr-ea.t prominence to
the will. However, voluntary action involves the exercise
of all the throe processes of mind--thinking, feeling, and
willing. Often the will is operative against the emotions;
this talces place when the desire is not to do the act. Vl'hen
there is a sentiment involvinG; some act as an ideal, it is
lArthur Holmes, Principles of Character I.~aking
("Lippincottrs Educational Series"; Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1913), p. 31.
2cr , pp. l? ff.
3James, "V'lill,"PSil., chap. xxv i , pp. 415-460.
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easier to initiate the act and sustain it. Such a voluntary
action is called ideal action.l This is the type of action
with which this part of the chapter is most concerned. It
requires both attendin~ to and interest in some goal desired,
which has been chosen and resolved upon, in order for any
kind of voluntary action to be initiated and maintained.
2. "Attention and Interest. ,,2
Attendin_g.--This activity of the will is merely will-
ing or conation viewed from the point of view of its effects
on thinking or cognitive processes.3 Attending is striving,
attempting, stretching forward to get a better view or under-
standing of an obj ect or idea. Accordin{~ to McDougall:
The more strongly we strive to see, to hear, to
understand, or in any way to achieve better or fuller
cognition, the more attentive are we. And conversely,
we are less attentive the less strongly we strive to
know or cognize the obj ect [or ideaJ Ln hand, the more
we are relaxed, the more nearly we sink into mere
passi vi ty.4
Attention is action; the man is active. "Absorption
of the organism in any particular task" is "attention ...5 liThe
fundamental condition of striving,1I or acting, is " that think-
ing of some obj ect shall stir up some conative disposi tion,"
shall excite the impulse of some instinct, and thus lead to
action; "that, accordinl:,;ly,is the fundamental condition of
IHob.es, Principles of Character MakinG, p. 32.
2UcDougall, Outline of Psy., chap. ix, pp , 26f)-283.
3Ibid., pp. 271f. 4Ibid., p. 272. 5Ibid., p. 110.
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, . tt d' ,,1attentlon' or a en lng. Attending may be involuntary or
spontaneous, or it may be voluntary and forced. The latter
is a higher form of attending and is achieved only by an
effort of'will. James says, "Ef'fort of attention is thus
the essential phenomena of will.,,2 Again, he says, "Consent
to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's sole achieve-
3ment." By "idea" he means the idea that is gaining attention
and commanding interest ..
Interest.--This activity of the will is largely con-
ative.4 To interest is to awaken concern; to be interested
is to be concerned about an object or idea to which one is
attending. It is the readiness to think when the object is
To have an "interestll In any object is, then, to
be ready to pay attention to it. Interest is latent
attention; and attention is interest in action. The
essential condition of both interest in and attention
to any abject is that the mind shall be so organized,
either natively or through experience, that it can
think of the object, and that such thinking shall
evoke some impulse or des':'rewhich mai:gtains a train
of activity in relation to the object.
presented to the senses, as McJougall says:
Concentrating.--Attending to an object may be momen-
tary, or it may endure for a time. In either case concentra-
ting all the processes of the mind on the object is necessary
1
McDougall., Outline of Psy., chap. Lx, p. 272.
2 3
Jaraes, Pey., p , 450. Ibid. 'n 452f_ , J!.I. •
4McDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 274-277.
5Ibid., p. 277.
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to attending to it. concentrating is bringing all of the
activities of the mind to focUS on a certain object. Thus,
when concentration has b 1i h deen accomp s e , attention begins;
as long as the mind is focused upon the obJ'ect, tt d_ a en ing to
it is pOSP.l·ble.~ It is the function of interest to maintain
concentration and attention.
1
3. Choosing and Resolving
Ch9osing.--ThiS activity of the will hardly needs
defining; however, it must be distinguished from such terms
as J'u1.. . l' tcglng, reso vlng, e c.
Choosing is selecting from
several or many objects one on which attention is to be con-
centrated. It is the procesS of deliberating prior to and
culminating in judging and resolving. McDougall states the
condi tions that malee choosinG necessary:
Without conflicting motives, we do not deliberate
on our choice of goal; though we may deliberate on
choice of means to a goal already adopted. In such
cases the choice of a means is a process as nearly
purely intellectual as any can be; our desire is
simply to lcnow what are the best means for the pur-
pose in hand. The choice of a goal, on the other
hand is alwayS a nrocess in which desire largely
dete;mines judgment; ••• : when. the dec~sion is
reached the process of dellberatlon termlnates in, d . t'an explicit judgment" expresse ln soma..p-sser 10n
as "That is my line, ' "That' s what I will aim at. ,,2
Resolvin_g.--ThiS activity of the will is simply
willing to do something, whether or not the nction follows;
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1McDougall,
2Ibi.s!_.,pp.
outline of p~., pp , 274,,278.
- ------445f.
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in other words, whether a resolution is carried into action
or not is not essential to making it. Resolving is more than
merely choosing; one may, in passing from one selection to
another (e.g., in making a purchase), discover that one of
these selections is the one of interest and the one that he
really desires, but for some reason (e.g., cost) he is not
quite able, at first, to make the resolution about it. Finally,
he does. ViT'.aeno ce a definite choice has been made, it some-
times requires a great deal of will-power to resolve to act
(e.g., to purchase the article selected), and again, it may
seemingly insignificant choices. A man's career is often
require very little. The point is that at least some vlill-
ing is required to make a resolution. Much depends on whether
or not it is made. Great issues are often determined by
shaped by some one resolution made with little thought of the
consequences.
Judging.--All resolutions are jUdgments. ItJudgment
is not cognitive merely. It is the interplay of cognition
and conation.ul While judgment is usually considered in the
2discussion of the cognitive processes, as done above, yet
decision is an act of the will. The judges decision is an
act that determines the amount of the criminal's penalty.
1
McDougall, Outline of PSI., p. 375.
2See p , 14.
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In order to make a judgment both thinking and willing are
necessary; also the action does not necessarily precede the
thinking. (It does in ref'lex actions.) "In such cases of
decision preceded by reasoned deliberation, we have the most
intimate and subtle interplay of the cognitive and the cona-
"Itive processes_ !lInmost developed or complete volitions,
explicit judgment does precede action.,,2 Voluntary action is
a.Lways preceded by reasoning. The one important, point is
this: Vlhen a man determines to act, the whole man--thinking,
feeling, and willin[;-..,z,oesintoaction.
4. Will and action
Will is the whole man in action. This action is either
good or bad, that is, moral or Lmmor-a'L, This dual aspect of
it, then, involves choice--choosing the good or the evil. The
man attends, thinks, desires, chooses, resolves, and then acts.
His choices determine his character. l\IcDougalldef'ines "'",Jill"
and "conscience" in this manner:
liTheWill!l is character in action; and "Con-
science" is moral character--character developed
under moral guidance, character in which the Tnoral
sentiments are duely incorporated in the system of'
the sentiments and, through the medium of'the sen-
timent of self-regard, are given due weight in all
moral issues; character consolidated by habitual
and consistent decision and action, in accordance
with the promptings of'the moral sentiments and of'
1
McDougall, Outline of Psy., p. 445.
2Ibid.
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1an unyielding self-respect.
This is purposeful activity toward one's own self-
betterment. "The idealof' character is the synthesis or
2harmonized system of moral sentiments." Conduct that real-
izes this ideal is moral. Conduct of this type "is generally
admitted to involve volition in the fullest sense. It is
decision and action in the line of most resistance, after
moral conflict and deliberat:Lon."3
Here's a hand to the boy who has courage
To do what he knows to be right.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
All honor to him if he conquers;
A cheer for the boy who says, "Nol,,4
1McDougall, Outline of'Psy., p. 442.
2Ibid., p. 441.
3Ibid• p.442.--- ,
4Phoebe Carey, "Be Steadfast," quoted by Ada Rose
Demerest, Educate for Total Abstinence (Cincinnati: The
Standard Pub. Co.;" 1934), p. 81.
D. lI~rhec,xcle of Mental Acti vi ty"l
Persons are always active; they are never static.
They are always doinB: somethin~. Their mental processes
should never be called states of mind, but activities of
mind. All thinking, all desiring, and all experiencing is
a process, and an on-going act Ivi ty towa.rd a goal. When
one tries to analyze this mental ac~ivity, he finds that
no matter with which process he begins--whether thinking,
feeling, or willing--, he finds it as McDougall says:
Mental activity is a cyclic process, a series of
cycles of activity_ Each cycle begins with some
cognition; the subject recognizes or thinks of aome
object. This object evokes in him an impulse to
effect some change, if only fuller cognition, more
definite recognition. The strivin~ thuB brings
about further cognition, which either satisfies the
impulse (when the process terminates) or fails to
do so, when the subject continues to strive, varying
the direction and nature of his efforts. This cyclic
character is perhaps most obvious in such an activity
as thinking out the moves of a game of chess. • • • •
• • It is generally admitted that all mental activity
has these three aspects, cognitive, conative, and
affective; and when we apply anyone of these three
adjectives to any phase of Mental process, we mean
merely that the aspect named is the most prominent of
the three at that moment. Each cycle of activity has
this triple aspect; though each tends to pass through
three phases in which cognition, conation, and affec-
tion are in turn most prominent; as when the natural-
ist, catchin~ sight of a specimen, recognizes it, CU.D-
tures it, and gloats over his capture.2
It is doubtful whether a better statement of these
facts could be found; nothinG more need be added to them.
lMcDougall, Outline of Psy., pp. 265f.
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Summary
A human person is a selr-conscious~ selr-directing
organism born with certain mental abilities that are highly
susceptible to great modirication and are modified greatly
f'rom year to year in his development, and who devotes his
activity toward his ovm apparent self-betterment. IIis con-
sciousness or nlind is composed of many processes. But for
purposes of study~ it can be analyzed into three main pro-
cesses: thinking, reeling~ and·willing. Through his perceiv-
ing~ remembering~ imagining, understanding, judging, and
reasoning he is able to acquire and organize his knowledge.
His emotions blend and surcharge his thinking vfith such great
desire ror his own self-betterment that his Whole attention
is held on his achieving this goal. Being moved with such
great desire~ his every action is ror his own apparent good,
and his every choice of means for achieving this end are made
with this in mind. His goal is his all-absorbing interest,
and so he attends to it. Being goaded on by his failures
to do his best and being led on by his great desire, he is
continually resolving to do better and still better. When
he concentrates all his mental activity, in its many cycles,
on his ovm goal, he conquers and goes on conquering.
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O}U~PTER III
THE RELIGIOUS PERSON AnD HIS
RELIGION
Introductory
Preliminary statement.--In chapter ii, a human person
and his mind were derined and his mind was analyzed. This
was in preparation ror a derinition or religion in this chap-
ter and ror a derinition or the religious sentiment in chapter
iv. The introductory portion or this chapter is devoted to
the derinition or a religiou.s person and to a preview or his
religion; the main portion or it is an examination or religion;
the de.finition or religion makes up the summar-y or the chapter.
Derinition or a religious person.--A human person was
derined abovel as a selr-conscious, selr-directing organism,
who devotes his activity toward his 0\711 apparent selr-better-
mente The religious person is merely one variety or persons.
He is derined, brierly, as a person who invokes the aid or a
superhuman being in his striving ror selr-betterment. And
this derinition is in harmony with the average man's view
that a religious person is one who worships or serves God
lor. pp. 8 and 38.
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(or heathen gods) and prays for aid from Him (or them). Thus,
further definition of the religious person is unnecessary for
the present.
The religious person's religionT-His religion involves
the whole of his mind; it is what he thinks, feels, and .,.rills
When he is religious. His mind, his religion, and his life
all should be synonymous terms for his activity and would be
if he were a perfect religious person. As it is, there is
lack of riar-mony and much conflict between them. 'I'hls conflict
has two causes: a lack of the under-stiand.Lng of what religion
really is and the failure to do as well as is known; The
first one of these two causes will be treated in this chapter
and the other will be touched upon in the next chapter.
Preliminary definition of religion.--It is necessary
to consider both of these causes of the conflict mentioned
above, before a final definition of religion can be Given.
But it is necessary to have some definite statement in mind
to help guide the study and to give it unity. As result of
considerable study, a preliminary definition can be given now.
It is this: a person's religion is his whole attitude toward
God and all that pertains to God. Of course, his attitude
(as ViaS seen in chapter ii) is composed of his thinking, feel-
ing, and willing when the whole man goes into action; there-
fore, his religious attitude is the 'whole man in cooperation
vrith God in st.r-Lv Lng for self-betterment. Leuba says: "A
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favorite custom among the more philosophically inclined
students of religion has been to condense the results of their
labor into little formulae called definitions of religion."l
Two ways of defining religion.--A person may define
religion by observing its manifestations in other persons,
or he may define it as he observes it in himself. These may
be called the objective and the subjective viewpoints of reli-
gion. There are some correlaries that f'ollow from these two
points of views: (1) Objectively, the same man may define
religion as largely intellectual or emotional or volitional,
according as he has been trained or according as he has been
influenced by his religious environrnent. (2) Subjectively,
through introspection, the intellectual man would be more
likely to define religion as largely intellectual; the emo-
tional man, as largely emotional; and the volitional man,
8.S largely volitional. However, even then any definition may
be colored more or less by training and religious background.
Several definitions have been quoted in the main part of this
chapter; it is not intended that these are all defined sub-
jectively. No attempt has been made to classify them as ob-
jective or subjective, because they are classified as to
intellectual, emotional, and volitional views.
Ciassification of definitions.--Pratt classifies the
aspects or "temperamental kinds" of religion as the traditional,
ILeuba, Psy. Study of ReI., p. 23.
~~'- _.,_,._ .. """'._ ..... ;.o;."".;:;;:;;:"";.;:';'~:.:;:;.-~- ..~.~;:-~.:::=.f:f·~~·-.=.-.~:~:;:_~·_"'~===----~_~-'--'"'=·:·c....~'.-
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the rational, the mystical, and the practical.
l
Leuba
classifies them according to intellect'Jalistic, affecti vistJc,
and voluntaristic, vieVls.2 But each haS a. different purpose in
mind .. For the purpose at hand, Leuba's principle of classi-
fication has been chosen; because, just as mind was analyzed
into intellect, emotion, and vri11 in the previous chapter, so
religious definitions have been classified according to the
intellectual, emotional, and volitional points of view.
1Pratt, ReI. Con., p. 14._-
2Teuba "GoIlc.tructive Criticism of Current Concep-
~ionB of Religion," ~. gl_t., ch"\,, ii, pp, 23-~4; ibi~.,
Defini tions of Religion and Cri tlcal Cormnents, .£E • .£2;1. ,
appendix, pp. 339-361.
A. The Intellectual Viev~oint
1. The View in Theory as Defined
The intellectual person.--This person is merely one
who naturally allows his thinking to be more prominent than
either his foeling or his willing. There are also different
degrees of intellectuality in intellectual persons. It is,
therefore, only natural that he should define his religion as
being mainly intellectual, and it is even possible that he
would define it as being wholly intellectual. If he goes to
this extreme he is then forced to consider his feelings that
accompany his religion as by-products rather than part or his
religion, and he is also forced to divorce his willing from
his religion and consider it to belong, not to religion, but to
morality. But not all go to this extreme. A few eX~1wles of
defining religion as mainly intellectual will illustrate this
point of'view.
Some definitions of religion.--Martineau defines
religion as a IIbelier in an Ever-living God, that is, a
Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding Mor-a'L
relations with mankind. III Cook quotes E. D. Tylor as saying
that religion is lithebelief in spiri tual beings .,,2 GaLl.oway
lJames Martineau, A Study of Religion: Its Sourcos
and Contents (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), Vol.I,p.l.
2E.B. Tyler, Primitive Culture,quotod by Cook,"Religion,"
HERE, X (1919), 663; cf", Leuba t s quotation of him in his Psy.~.
of ReI., pp. 70ff.
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tentatively defines religion as "man's faith in a power be-
yond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and
gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of
wor-ah l.p and service. ,,1 In all three of these the emphasis
is thrown on the intellect by mak Lrig religion 11fai bh" and
considering faith as belonging to the intellect. Galloway,
in his discussion leading up to 11is tentative definition,
states that religion includes all three faculties; belief,
feeling, and vdll, but it 1s evident in his thinking that be-
lief is the main faculty. Sterrett says that Hegel defines
religion as "the knowledge possessed by the finite mind of
its nature as absolute mind. ,,2 Frederich lJIax Milller says that
religion is "a subjective faculty for the approhension of tl1.e
infinite,1I also, that IIrolig10n is a mental faculty which,
dependent of, nay, inspite of sense and reason, enables man
to apprehend tho inf'inito and under different riarne s and under
varying disguises.1I3 He calls religion "faith" and makes it
spring wholly from the intellect. .Tevons is quoted as saying:
"Religion as a form of thought is the perception of' 'the in-
visible things of'Him through the things that are made. ,,,4
IGeorge Galloway, The Philosophy of Religion (NeVIYork:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), p. 184.
2Sterrett, Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion,
quoted by Leuba, Psy. Study of':Hel., p. 344.
3Frederich ~';lax.Muller, Lectures on the Origin and
Growth of'Religion as illustrated by the religions of'India,
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, l879),p. 21.
4F.Byron .Tevons, History of Religion, pp.9f, quoted
.by Luub a, .2E,. cit., p. 344.
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One more definition will suffice to illustrate the intel-
lectual point of view; it is by Milnsterberg:
Religion is the completion of experience. It does
not complete merely actual experience; that is the
task of science, and faith would do more than simply
fill up the gaps in science. Such gaps can be
filled only by means of possible experience, while
faith, not only with transcendent but also with
i~nanent conceptions of God, goes beyond all that
is given. The given universe and the given indi-
vidual power-s are not sufficient to enable us to
experience the totality of the ideal. The indi-
vidual who feels values completes the universe 1
through revelation and his ovm powers through prayer.
Their religious differentia.--~lis is faith. The
terrns such as "f'aithll "belief',II TTthought," ITperception,TT etc.
ref'er to the intellect. All, except possibly Hegel, who says
that religion is "knowledge" (science), relegate religion to
the realm of'f'aith and science to the realm of'Imowledge,
thus carrying on the apparent conf'lict between science and
religion. Since religion is the whole attitude of the religious
person toward God and what pertains to God, that kind of'
"religion" def'ined above is hardly more than theology in
theory and practice. If'theology can be defined as knowledge
about God or the science of the ~~owledge of'God, then reli-
gion and science may be called "twin sisters.1I2
The import of these definitions.--It should be noted that
IHugO l:iunsterberg, The Eternal Values, p. 358, quoted
by Leuba, Psy. Study of'ReI" p. 345.
2Thomas Huxley, quoted and commented on by Leuba, oD.cit.,p. 24. -- ----
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no one can put his conception of'religion into f'ewwords, and
so the above definitions do not represent all that their
authors have to say_ Vfuile they are fragmentary definitions,
there are very good ideas--truths--expressed in all of'them.
But, it is also true that all of' them limit religion, if not
wholly, then almost wholly, to the intellect.
2. The View in Practice Deficient
Catechising and confirming. --Those churches Haintaininc;
their growth largely by catechising and confirming children
have always put too much emphasis on the intellect.
To a large extent these churches continue this method of'
training in the present day, holding to the traditions based
on creeds, theologies, etc. This method is a"surviva:r'of the
M:edieval Church which almost made the intellect the sole func-
tion of' the religious person in Christianity.l As long as
churches hold to their creeds, tenets, theologies, etc., they
vvil1 continue to give prominence to the intellect, even though
they recognize that f'eeling and will have some par-t in the
f'~mction of the religious person.
Modern Christian education.--Besides the traditional view,
there are those who wo u.Ld make religion hardly more than the
culture of' the intellect. They do this by advocating the so-
IGeorge Park Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine
("The International Theological Libraryll; New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1899), p. 255.
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called "Christian education" as the solution of'the problem
of making the Vlorld Christian. They would make the church
largely an educational institution.l
!EEe~in~~ the intellect.--This method of trying
to develop religious people has proven a very inefficient one.
It will ini'luence the intellectual person probably more than
any other type, but even then, far greater influence can be
had by appealing to the whole mind--intellect, emotions, will.
1
George Albert Coe, What Is Christian Education?
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935); and others.
B. The Emotional ViewEoint
1. The View in Theory as Derined
The emotional nerson.--This type of person is usually
more easily recognized than either the intellectual or the
volitional person, since he finds it hard to conceal his
emotions when they are exci~ed by some object. There are
different degrees of sentimentality in sentimental or emo-
tional persons. It, therefore, is only natural that he would
define his religion as being mainly emotional, and it is even
possible that he would define it as being wholly emotional.
In this case, he is rorced to consider his thinking as doc-
trinal and his willing as moral, divorcing both from his
religion and calling them theology and ethics respectively.
A f'eviexamp Le s of def'ining religion as mainly emotional will
illustrate this point of'view.
Some definitions of'religion.--Leuba says that
Schleiermacher is lithe be sb-dcnown representative of this
classll who def'ine religion rrom the a.ffectivistic point of
viewl and that he vigorously attacks the intellectual con-
ception:
Religion cannot and will not originate in the
pure impulse to lmow.. • • • Vmat you may know or
believe about the nature of thin$s is f'ar:)eneath
the sphere of religion. • • • • any effort to pen-
ILeuba, Psy. Study of ReI., p. 33.
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etrate into the nature or sUbstance of thin~s is no
lon~er reli~ion, but seeks to be a science.of somesort.
Further, he says that this "sphere of reli~ion ••••
jsneither thinkin~ nor actin~, but intuition and feelin,,112
--:re_eling excited oy any oOj ect in the universe. Leuba Is COID-
ment is: "Pure religion is pure feeling; that is feeling dis-
connected from thoug~t and from action: 'What we feel and are
conscious of in reli~ious emotions is the operation of things
upon us, not our reaction to the received impressions. ,,,3
Finally, in a subsequent book Schleiermacher arriTes at this
well-kno\1\1Ilstatement: "The essence of religion consists in a
feeling of absolute dependence upon God. ,,4
Leuba quo t es' Herbart as holding that "SYlnpathy with
the universal dependence of man is the essential natural prin-
ciple of all religion"5 and Comenius as saying: "By religion
we understand that inner veneration by which the mind of man
attaches and binds itself to the supreme Godhead."6
Tiele says: "I am satisfied that a careful analysis
~Frederich Schleienuacher, The Nature of Religion,
pp. 48f., quoted by Leuba , Psy. Study of ReI., PP. 33, 346.
3Ibid., p , 34.
4Frederich Schleiermacher, The Doctrine of Faith,
quoted by Leuba, Pay. Study of Rel., p. 34.
5.Johann Frederich Herbart, Science of Education, p.171, quoted by Leuba, .£I2.. cit., pp. 321'. -
6.Johann Anios Comenius, Great Didactic, Keating tr.,
p , 190, quoted by Lellba, .Q1?_. cit., p. 351.
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of religious phenomena compels us to conclude that they are
all traceable to the emotions--traceable to them, I say, but
not originating in them. ITheir origin lies deeper." ~ ...tiga~n,
Leuba quotes Tiele:
We mean • • • • that religion is, in truth, that
pure and reverential disposition or frame of mind
wh i ch we call piety • • • • How, whenever I discover
piety • • • • I maintain that its essence, and there-
fore the essence of religion itself, is adoration.
• • • Adoration necessarily involves the elements of
holy awe , humble reverence, grateful acknowledgement
of every token of love, hopeful confidence, lowly
self'-abasement, a deep sense of one's own unworthiness
ru~d shortcomings, total self-abn~gation, and uncondition-
al consecration of one's whole life and one's whole
faculties •••• But at the same time •••• adora-
tion includes a desire to possess the adored object,
to call it entirely one's ovm.2
D. G. Thompson is quoted as saying that Ilreligion
is the aggregate of those sentiments in the human mind arising
in connection vd th the r-eLatLon s assumed to subsist between
the order of'nature (inclusive of the observer) and a postu-
lated supernatural.,,3
T:t1.eir"religious differentia.!!'-Leuba says that in
this class of definitions, "a par-bLcuLar- emotion or sentiment,
usually termed 'feeling,' is seized upon as the religious dif-
ferentia. The affective experiences most frequently singled
out for this purpose are fear, awe, reverence, adoration, piety,
lCornelis Petrus Tiele, Science of Religion,II, 15,
quoted by Leuba, £E. cit., p. 348.
2Tiele, .2E.- cit., 198f., quoted by Leuba, Psy. Stud!
of ReI., p. 349; cf. p. 33.
3Daniel Greenleaf Thompson, The Religious Sentiment
of the Human f.and, quoted by Leuba, .£.Eo cit., p. 351.
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d d 1 d'· f 1· ,,,1epen once, ove, an cosmlC ee lng. Religion is
marked by the aggregate of these sentiments (Thompson), while
philosophy is marked by its intellectual na bur-o and ethics is
marked by its volitional nature. Religion is feeling (Tiele).
The import of these definitions.--Some of them are
more accurately called descriptions, because of their length
as well as their nature. vVhat was said of the intellectual
class is true also of the emotional class, nrunely, that no
one of them expresses its author's complete thought. If
Thompson's aggregate of' the sentiment were interpreted to mean
what vias given as the meaning of sentiment in chapter ii,2 he
would be very near the truth, if not fully correct in his view.
But in so far as has been observed, his view, or that of any
of the others quoted, ShJUIH:te interpreted in that way. Their
idea of emotion and sentiment is that of'pure feeling--that
is, without any conative or cognative elements in them. How-
ever some of them recognize that 1"eligion is deeper than mere
feelings (e8g., Tiele), and they say also that it results in
action (e.g., Tiele). Compare the above quotations with this:
Concerning the origin of religion, Tiele writes
that it "begins wi bh conceptions awalcerie.d by emotions
and experiences, and theseconceptions awakened produce
def'inite sentiments, which were already present in
germ in the :first emotion, but which can only be
aroused to consciousness by these conception~; and
1
Leuba, OPe cit., p. 32.---
2Cf• trlnstJ.·nct," l"-'t.""Em t· " aor dPP. I., I 0 aon , pp s z .; an
"Sentiment," pp. 24ff.
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these sentiments manifest themselves in actions.l
After all that has been said about not interpreting
Tiele's view of sentiments to mean what was meant and de-
scribed in chapter ii and what Le uba says about Tiele's view,
he may be more nearly correct than has been accredited to him.
While there seems to be some indication that he had somewhat
similar ideas abjut sentiments as those set forth in this
dissertation, there does not seem to be enough evidence
in the abovE; qu.otation even to say that he held such a theory
of sentiments as that described in chapter ii.
t
2. The View in Practice Deficient
l[odern evangelism ..--Evangelism in its modern method
of reclaiming people began in England and A'nerica during the
close of the eiehteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
centuries and remains today in a modified form a prominent
method of the evangelistic churches for maintaining their
growth.. The "pLe t t at i c" appeal of Whi tefield and the 1Yesleys
was sorely needed at the ti::nemodern evangelism beGan; theirs
was a noble purpose and undertaking; they accomplished much.
rrhe success of their efforts Viaspossible, not because they
appealed to the emotions alone, but because they appealed to
the intellect and to the will also--that is, they appealed
to the whole mind, though they put the emphasis on the
11'1ele, 2..I2.~ _s:it.,p , 67. quoted by Leuba, .2£. ci t.,p.349.
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emotions.l Otherwise, they would have been more successful.
Revivalism and hi~h-pressure eV8nGelis~.--The nobler
methods of evangelism are not bein{; attacked. here; only cer-
tain me tho d.s used to increase church membership, "IIirltichare not
worthy of being called evangelism, are being condemned. The
so-called. revival meeting to revive the church that is evan-
gelistic is not only illogical and ineffective, but it is ab-
solutely a detriment to the church. .An evangelistic church
should never have to be revived. Such is what is called "re-
viv8,lism." "High-pressure" evangelism and. other low orders
of evanGelism are other results of the degeneration of the
noble mov emen t and undertaking of 'rmitefield and the 'Yesleys.
These are the evils that are being condemned. here.2
Annealing to the emotions.--This method. of trying to
develop religious people is like the sea with its tide, waves,
and breakers. A tide of revivalism sweeps the country and
then ebbs. The life of each church during this petiod is
like a series of waves that ends in a breaker. Such work is
not lastinG:; it cannot yeild permanent results. There is no
onward movement, just as there is no forward movement in the
waves. Just as the tide ebbs and flows, so revivals come and
go. Success lies only in appeEtling to the whole wind.
?-,T.Harwood Pattison, tiTheEighteenth Century, tI The
History of Christian Preacllinti(?hiladelL)hia: rrlleAr,lerican-
Baptist Publishing Society, 1903), chap. x, pp. 242-277.
2Cliff E. Barber, Sin and the New Psychology (N~w
York: The Abingdon Press, 1930). ~
C& The Volitional Vie'wpoint
I.The View in Theory as Defined
The volitional oerson.--Like the other two types of
persons, the intellectual and emotional, the volitional man
emphasizes one of the three mental processes, the vlill, more
than he does the other processes. There are many very strong-
willed persons, and there are many weak-willed persons; there
are all degrees between. It is only natural that the voli-
tional person define his religion as largely belonging to
the vli11, if not wholly of the will. In the case that he
defines it as wholly of the vlill, he makes it purely practi-
cal, eliminating completely the theoretical and aesthetical
aspects of it. A few examples of this kind of defining re-
ligion will illustrate this point of view.
Some definitions of religion.--F. H. Bradley says:
We have found that the essence of religion is
not knowledge. And this certainly does not mean that
its essence consists barely in feeling. Religion is
rather the attempt to express the complete reality
of goodness through every aspect of our being.
Sabatier says that the essence of religion flisa COl11-
merce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul
lFrancis Horbert Bradley, _Appearance and Reality: A
Metaphysical Essay (2d ed,, London: George Allen and UwLn , Ltd.,
1920), p. 453. 54
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in distress enters vlith the mysterious power on which it
feels that it and its destiny depend. rill According to
Reville, "Religion rests above all upon the need of'man to
realize an harmonious synthesis between his destiny and the
opposing influences he meets in the world.,,2 Josiah Royce
says that "religion is the consciousness of our practical re-
3lation to an invisible, spiritual order." According to Kant,
when religion is considered subjectively, it is titherecog-
nition of all our duties as divine commands.,,4 This should
be compared with his principle of ethics, his "categorical
imperative," 'which is merely anobh.ez- way of stating the Golden
Rule: "Always act so that you can will the max Imum or deter-
mining principle of your action to become universal law; act
so that you can will that everybody shall f'ollow the principle
of our action."5
James says that "the word 'religion' cannot stand for
any single principle of'essence, but is rather a collective
IAuguste Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophie of Religion
based on Psychology and History (New York: James Pott & Co.,
1897), p. 27.
2 .A. Reville, La Rellgion des puples non-civilises, I,
120, quoted by Leuba, Psy. Study of ReI., p. 352.
3
Josiah Royce, quoted by Leuba, ££. cit., p. 357.
4Imrnanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzon der
blossen Vernunft, quoted by Leuba, ~ cit., p. 358.
5
Thilly, Hist. of Philos., p. 423.
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name.t'll In the same lecture he says:
Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily
to take it, shall mean for us the fee12ngs. acts and.
experiences of individual men in their solitude, so
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation
to whatever they may consider the divine. Since- the
relation may be either moral, physical, or ritual, it
is evident that out of religion in the sense in which
we take it. theologies, philosophies-,> and ecclesiasti-
cal organizations may secondly grow.~
He has in mind stoicism and such like when he says:
Now in those states of mind vhich fall short of
religion, the surrender is submitted to as an imposition
of necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone at the very
best vii thout complaint. In the religious life, on the
contrary, surrender and sacrifice are positively espoused:
even unnecessary givings-up are added in order that the
happiness may increase. Religion thus makes easy and
felicitous what in any cas,e is necessary; and if it be
the only agency that can accomplish this result, j.ts
vital importance as a human faculty stands vindicated
beyond dispute, performing a function which no other
por-t f.on of our nature can so successfully fulfill.3
He starts out in his next lecture by characterizing
"the religious life in the broadest and most general term::::
possible" as lithe belief that there is an unseen order, and
that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adj us t ing ourselves
thereto. This belief ~nd this adjustment are the religious
attitude of the soul.n4 In his concluding lecture, he sums
up "in the broadest possible way the characteristics of the
religious life. II adding to the above, prayer or communion Viith
God; Ita. new zest" in life; 'an assurance of safety and a temper
~Wi1,liam James, The Varieties of
("Gifford Lectures on Na ural Re11g2on,'
Longman's Green, & co , , 1925), p. 26.
2Ibid., p. 31. 3~., pp. 51f. 'lIb' .- 1Q., p , 53.
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of peace, and, in relation to others, a preponderance of
loving affection."l In a sense, religion is a forced option,
as James might say, and dependent on"the will to believe.,,2
T8nnies says that religion "is essentially social"
arid describes it as being Itofa twof'oLd nature," tbat is,
hewing a twofold function: political and ethical.3 His
description of the political indicates that he means eccle-
siastical, and , .tUS description of the ethical reflects the
"pure and undefiled religion'! of James 1:27; cf', Me,tthew 25:
31-<16. Prince Kropotkin, leader of the Anarchist movement,
is said by Le uba to stress the social aspect: "For him, 'a
passionate desire for working out a new, better form of
society' is a religious impulse ...4
Their religious differentia.--The volitional person
relegates religion to only a faculty of the mind--the will.
"Duty for duties sake" is their motto; duty is the specific
differentia. It takes two phases: the theoretical in the
form of ethics, theology, and pragmatic philosophy. and the
practical in the form of morals, social gospel, etc. Aqcord-
IJames. Varietl§s of Religious EX]2Grienc.£_,pp.4.86f.
2Wi llimn James. ~rhe WIll to Jje]..iev..Q.and other Rssays
in PopulHr Philosophy tNew ~ork: Longman's, Green,& Co.,J902),
'0'0. 1-31-- :)F~ T8nnies "The Origin and Function of Religion, u
SociOlogj_.c.aJ.PftEQ.E.~,fII,237, quoted by Le uba , £2.. ci~.t p , ~'if)[).
4Prince Kropotkin, "The Ethical Needs of the P~esent
Day," The Nineteenth Century, LVI (August, }904), 207-226,
quoted by Le uba , .2.Q.. cit.. p. 358.
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ing to Upton, "It is the felt relationship in which the
finite self-consciousness stands to the immanent and uni-
versal ground of all being, which constitutes religion."l
The import of these definitions.--In the first place,
so many statements from the men quoted have been left out of
this section that a very incomplete idea has been given of
just what some of them say, as well as the viewpoint of the
voluntaristic definition of religion in general is fragmen-
tary. An adequate idea of it is not possible in so limited
a space; this is true to some extent of the other two view-
points. From the above definitions, it is very evident that
without the desire that causes a person to do more than he is
asked or feels necessary, as James made so clear in his state-
ment quoted above,2 he does not have the religion described by
James. J&~es makes it clear in his statement that religion
is far more than mere ethics. They recognize emotions as
being connected with religion, but they do not make them part
of it; or, if it is granted that some of them do, feelings
are made a very little part of religion. To talcereligion in
the general sense of the volitional person's point of view is
a very narrow view to say the least.
\rPton, The Basis of Religious Belief e'Ribbert
Lectures," 1893), quoted by Leuba, .2.E.!. cit., p. 357.
2Cf. p.56 (middle of page).
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2. The View in Practice Deficient
Ecclesiasticism.--The dominating spirit of ecclesiasti-
clsm hardly needs to be mentioned here, except to say that
this aspect of religion is to be greatly deplored because of
its corruption as a political organization. It could never
hope to succeed, in the first place, and it is not wor-bhy of
IChristianit~ in the second place.
The 80ci8:.1gospel.--The other phase of religion i'rom
the voluntaristic viewpoint manifests itself in the social
gospel. Since this movement has considerable influence on
others that are not considered as belonging to it, it should
be noted here. It is really hardly more than an ethical move-
ment. It never has had such influence as "revivalism" has,
and it probably never will. It is not the whole gospel and
should not be allowed to deceive anyone in thinking that it
2is.
Appealing to the will.--This method of trying to de-
velop religious people is like trying to drive balky horses
or mules. It is only natural that When sheer force fails to
move people, persuasion is resorted to. This is merely a
tacit confession of failure to move the will directly. The
IBurke Aaron Hinesdale, Ecclesiastical Tradition:
its origin and early gro'lyth,its place in the churches, and
its value (Cincinnati: r:flheStandard Pub. Co., 1879).
2Chester Carlton, The Genesis of the Social Gospel,
the meaning of the ideas of Jesus in the light of their
antecedents (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929).
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one redeeming feature of this viewpoint is the resorting to
the pragmatic test; if' it works, use it. But pragmatism is
only possible when there is a persuasion to make the test.
After the desire is created to tryout a thing, then the
pragmatic test can be applied. "Duty .for duties sake" has
never conquered the stubbor-n will.
D. Definition of Religion
Introductory statement.--The three different points
of view have been analyzed and each has been seen to be only
an aspect of religion rather than the whole of it. Further,
it has been seen that to take anyone of the three views is
to hold a very narrow conception of the meaning of religion.
After considering briefly the three views described above a
definition will be stated that will include the whole of
religion, and thus it will include all the truths in the
statements and definitions quoted above.
1. The three views considered briefly
Faith as religion.--First, as far as the intellect is
concerned, religion is dependent upon faith, and this faith
is a far higher and more satisfying faith than can inductive
science at its best ever expect to reach. The faith that is
contained in pure and uncorrupted theology is the attitude or
sentiment of divine psychology, fOI' faith is not wholly intel-
lectual. It is basically intellectual, but it has an emotional
and a volitional element also. The only vmy that students of
religion in the past could define religion in terms of faith
and claim it to be wholly of the intellect, is to limit faith
to the intellect. Intellectual assent to any proposition is
only the intellectual element of faith. A faith that believes
61
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because it feels that the proposition is true is a faith that
is religious, because pure intellectual assent to a proposi-
tion is merely rationalism. A faith that is the result of
"the will to believe" is a faith that is controlled, not by
the whims of a person, but by the will of a person. Such a
faith is both felt and willed, for without the desire to be-
lieve, the continued willing to believe is impossible. The
more faith is fused with desire and will the more it approaches
the religious ideal for faith.
S~nti~nt as religion.--In some of the above defini-
tions of the emotional person's religion, religion was called
a sentiment. Only in the narI'OW sense of the term can senti-
ment be considered as an element of religion, for religion is
more than feeling. As the term sentiment was defined above in
chapter ii,l it requires all three elements--the intellectual,
the emotional, and the volitional--to make up its elements.
Vfuen the term sentiment is used in its nar-r-ow sense, it can
not be made to include the whole of religion. Only by using
it in its broad sense can it be made to include the whole of
religion. This is the sense it has been used in chapter iv.
Practice of religion.--Practice furnishes the person
the opportunity to live what he believes--to live according
to his attitude t-owar-d God. and all that pertains to God.
"Faith apart from works is barren.112 Religion involves not
I 2
Of. pp. 24ff. James 2'.
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only desire, the more it approaches the ideal or religion.
Every act ought to be prompted by love, not rrom the sense
of duty alone. Religion involves not only the person him-
self, but his f'ellovvman. The more will is charged with de-
sire, the more it approaches the ideal of'religion. Besides
the social aspect or religion there are acts of service to
God, ceremonies to be performed, rites to be observed, litur-
gies to be sung, prayers to be off'ered, etc. It takes all of
this to express one's f'aith and attitude toward God. All of'
this is simply the striving f'or self'-betterment and invoking
the aid of God in the striving. Leuba says:
In its objective aspect, active religion consists,
then, of' attitudes, practices, rites, ceremonies, in-
stitutions; in its subjective aspect, it consists of'
desires, emotions, and ideas, instigating and accom-
panying these objective manirestations.l
2. All gathered up into the whole
Religion as the whole man.--Leuba says that "religion
involves the whole man."2 Religion is variable; it varies
with the man. In whatever way a man changes, his religion
changes accordingly. It has been said that religion springs
from some impulse to action; there is no "religious instinct."
But flany impulse, any desire, may lead to religious activity.,,3
That is his religion at that time. One's general religious
3Ibld., p , 7.
Leuba, Psy. Study of ReI., p. 53. 2Ibld.,p.57.
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behavior as viewed by others will vary gradually; religion
is never static but active, just as the man is never static
but always active. The religion of a country or of a race
of people varies in time, so religion must be defined so as
to meet all of these conditions. Pratt defines religion as
"an attitude," meaning by the word "attitude" "that responsive
side of consciousness which is found in such things as at-
tention, interest, expectancy, feeling, tendencies to reaction,
etc."I "Thus it is not to be confined to anyone of the
three traditional departments of the mind--'knowing, feeling,
willing,' but •••• includes what there was of truth in
the historical attempts to identify religion with feeling,
2
beliefJ, or will." Pratt, thus, uses the term "attitude"
3exactly the same way as McDougall uses the term "sentiment."
In the definition that has been formulated as the result of
this study and is being proposed now, the term "sentiment"
means "attitudeTl as was stated above.4
Definition of religion.--Religion, therefore, may be-
defined as the wholo attitude of a person toward God and all
that pertains to God--which attitude is composed of thinking,
feeling, and willing-- which attitude arises in consciousness
as the result of the influence of environment on native
capacities for developing this sentiment or attitude, which
I
Pratt, ReI. Co~, p. 2.
3 .~b~d., pp. 74, 214, 307.
2
illQ., p. 3.
4Ci';p.25ff.
65
grows and femctions as the determiner of the thinking, the
feeling, and the willing of the religious man in his striving
for self-betterment. Hughes well says:
In realit:y~,the weakness of all the views which treat
religion as if it wer-e derived from anyone of the various
aspects of man's seli'-conscious life lies in the fact that
they make an unwarrented cleavage in consciousness ..and
that therefore, they m~~e man religious only in a part
of his being. Man is not religious, when religion is
real to him, in his reason or his will or his feeling
only. He is religious in them all, in his whole manhood
at its highest and best, for religion lays every faculty
and power under tribute. It raises every aspect of con-
sciousness to a level of higher and more intense life,
and in the integrating power of communion with God, it
r-eriewa and transforms the whole man s I
2Again, as wa s said above, a man f s religion, his life,
and his mind should be synonymous terms for his activity in
striving .for sel.f-betterment. How, the truth of this statement
should be evident. Religion involves the whole man. Man lives
his religion just as he lives his life; thus, man makes his
religion fit his life, or he makes his life fit his religion,
according to his desire. Man not only makes his own religion,
but religion makes the man; religion makes the man who makes
his religion. When he is a co-worker with God they together
make true religion--Christianity. A Christian is a religious
man whose whole life is transformed "by the renewing of the
Whole mind3 so as to have the mind of Christ.4
pp. 98,
1Thomas
99.
2
Cf. p.
Hywell Hughes, PsycholoF3 and Religious Origins,
40. 3Cf• Rom. 12: If.
4C1'• I Cor. 2°.1o~,0 Phlol 205 esp 1 11• 0, • - •
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A religious person is one who invokes the aid o£ a
superhuman being in his striving £or self-betterment. This
involves the whole man--intellect, emotions, and will. His
religion is his whole attitude toward God and all that per-
tains to God. This activity includes all o£ his activities
--thinking, feeling, and willing-- as organized into this
attitude or sentiment. This attitude is a system of senti-
ments organized around God as the object. It does not in-
clude that part o£ a man's thinking, £eeling, and willing
which is opposed to God, but that part which is toward God.
Pure religion casts out all that is £oreign to the nature
o£ the religious sentiment, and thus life, religion, and mind
become the same. All of the activities o£ the man are directed
toward his own self-betterment, but he invokes the aid of,
and cooperates with, God in his striving. Thus, the proper
understanding o£ what religion is eliminates one of the
causes o£ the conflict between religion and life; coopera-
tion of the whole man with God leads to successful and har-
monious striving £or sel£-betterment. A study of the three
viewpoints of religion has clarified the other cause of the
conflict between li£e and religion, that is, the failure to
do as well as is known. The next chapter will only touch
upon this cause. It is primarily an analysis of the religious
sentiment.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT
Introductory
Preliminarv statement. __--In chapter ii, a human person
was de:fined and his mind was analyzed. In chapter iii, the
religious person and his religion were def'ined. This was in
preparation for the analysis of the religious sentiment in
this chapter. The introductory portion of this chapter has
been devoted to a consideration of' sentiments in general; it
is based on the discussion of sentiments in chapter ii. The
remainder of this chapter has been devoted to an analysis of
the religious sentiment.
Sentiments.--These are "organized colonies of feelings";
each sentiment or colony of feelings is "gathered about an
idea"; and these sentiments "exercise an almost irresistible
1and decisive effect upon character." This is just another
2way of summarizing what was said in chapter ii. Each colony
of feelings is "organized securely and comparatively definitely
about ideas, persons, and things." They "work themselves out
1Arthur Holmes, Il'heMind of St. Paul: A Psychologi-
cal Study (New York. The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 55.
2C:f. pp. 24ff. 67
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in actions, or behavior"; they are "released by the will"
and are "guided by the idea.1I IIThey develop through the or-
dinary struggles of' life" as well as through "deliberate
education." One of' two destinies await them: either they
"mainta~n their lustiness by practice,1I or, they "die by
neglect" and "go like mites into a sunbeam." There are three
main classes of sentiments (i.e., fully-organized systems of
sentiments): sentiments of'love, hate, and respect; there are
two sub-classes of' sentiments: sentiments directed toward
self and toward others. These are all characterized by re-
pulsion or by attraction according as their objects are re-
Ipuasive or attractive.
The so-called "religious instinct."--From all that
has been said thus far concerning sentiments, there can be
no innate instinct as the root of the religious sentiment.
The religious sentiment cannot be excited innately and in-
stinctively by an object but it is excited emotionally by the
object around which it centers, which is God. McDougall says:
Many authors have written of the religious instinct
or instincts, though f'ewhave made any serious attempt
to make clear the meaning they attach to these phrases.
Those who use these phrases usually seem to imply that
this assumed religious instinct of'man is one that is
his peculiar endovnnent and has no relation to the in-
stincts of the animals.· But I do not know that ~his
is now seriously maintained by any psychologist.
lHolmes, Mind. of Paul, p. 55.
2McDougall, Soc. Psy., p. 309.
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The instinctive actions in the religious life are the
same that enter into ordinary life. The emotions aroused by
the objects that one meets in life are the same emotions that
are aroused by the thought of God. But it is the object a-
round which they are organized that determines whether they
are religious or not" While the emotions are the same, yet
they blend into a different kind of system when organized
around God as their unifying object. This organized system
of sentiments is called the religious sentiment.
Definition of the religious sentiment.--It may, there-
fore, be defined as the whole attitude of a man toward God as
its object; an attitude arising in consciousness through the
contemElation of God, who arouses instinctive action and ~-
companying emotions that blend to form the whole attitude; an
attitude developed through increase of the knowledge of God
and throupJl struggling to become perfect like God; and an at-
titude that exercised an almost irresistible and decisive
effect uEon character by determining almost completely one's
activit;!. It comprises "faith, hope, and love, and the great-
est of these is love""l The greatest of these is discussed
first.
1 Cor. 13:13
A. The Love of God the Father
1. Preliminary Considerations
What is love?--Love has been defined as "intelligent
good willll;l it may also be expressed as "intelligently wish-
ing one well" or "intelligent best wishes." While the f'irst
one puts the proper emphasis on the will, the last two put
more emphasis on the emotional content of love. All three
give due emphasis to the intellectual content. These ex-
press the idea meant by the idea of'LOVE f'or some one. ~Vhen
love is directed toward God, he becomes the object of love.
Sentiment of love for God.--Love is here used to mean
an organized system of sentiments directed toward God; he is
the object or center around which this sentiment of love is
organized. As all sentiments have intellectual, emotional,
and volitional contents; so does love for God. Since love
for God is such a complex sentiment, it will require first a
study of' the emotions that blend to f'orm the secondary sen-
timents in the system; secondly a study of these secondary
sentiments that blend to form Lo.ve for God.
2. Emotions that Blend to Form Secondary Sentiments
Mt. Sinai.--Perhaps the best illustration of'awe for
God is the dramatic scene at Mt. Sinai when God uttered the
lsource of' this definition not known to writer.
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1Decalogue in the hearing of the people of Israel. It is
rich in detail and illustrates most of the instincts and
emotions connected with and entering into the sentiment of awe
toward God. Fear, wonder, and meakness are the primary emo-
tions that blend in forming the sentiment of awe.
Curiosity and wonder.--God had given Moses directions;
bounds had been set around the mountain. Preparation served
to increase the curiosity o~ the people in great measure. The
people were so curious that they would have entered into the
holy precincts themselves, had not God warned them not to do
so. They had drawn as near as they dared to the mountain in
order to view the thing that was now about to take place.
The instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder were ex-
cited. A general state of expectancy was in the air.
Fear and flight.--The mountain smoked, the thunder
rumbled and shook the earth, the lightning flashed and rent
the sky, and the Voice spoke. The people, before curious,
now feared and drew back from the mountain, trembling and cry-
ing out, "Let not God speak vii th us, lest we die. ,,2 The physical
manifestations of the awful presence and power o~ God excited
the instinct to flee and the emotion of fear. Enough curiosity
was left to keep them from taking to full flight; instead,
they merely moved back some distance ~rom the wonderful sights.
1
Ex. 19 & 20. 2Ex. 20: 18f~.
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Be~ore, curiosity was the stronger emotion, and they approached
the mountain; a.fterward, fear was the stronger emotion, and
they drew back from the mountain.
Submission and meekness.--In this wonderful incident
the instinct to submit to God Omnipotent and the emotion of
meekness or submissive self-feeling toward God were aroused
also by the aw.ful presence and power of God mani.fested in the
physical phenomena. vVhile they .feared yet they were held at
a distance through curiosity that they might have the oppor-
tuni ty to behold the phenomena in wonder and admfr-at Lon ,
Self-assertion and elation.--The people showed that
their instinct to assert themselves was aroused by the fact
that they said to Moses, "Speak thou with us and we will hear,
but let not.God speak with us, less we die."1 Sil'lceit was an
almost total submission, the assertive instinct struggled
t_o..appear in the complex situation. The phenomena, even if
it did fill with fear, aroused a sort of elation in the thrill
it gave the wondering people.
Appeal and distress.--The instinct to appeal to some
power for help or protection in time of distress is evident
in the statement of the people. Though distress is mixed with
fear, the .feeling of distress is clearly manifest; the people
seem almost ready to become frantic; hence, the cause of the
--------------.----------,------.------------------------------.------1Ex. 20:19.
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exclamation in their appeal for protection.
Mount of Transfiguration.--The above illustration --
the scene at Mt. Sinai-does not seem to furnish any evidence
of any tenderness (the tender emotion sometimes called "love.")
But there is abundant evidence that Jesus was beheld (looked
1 2
upon) with admiration at the scene of his transfiguration.
Also there are other emotions manifest in this scene that
were not manifest at Mt. Sinal. The transfiguration is pro-
bably the most sublime scene ever exacted on earth.
Service and tenderness.-- The disciples had learned
to hold Jesus with great tenderness and sympathy. He was
their Master whom they served. On the mount this tenderness
and the desire to serve were aroused. Peter, filled with holy
awe and reverence (these to be discussed later), said, "Lord,
it is good for us to be here: if thou wilt, I will make three
tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for
Elijah.,,3 There Peter wanted to real11inapart from the world
and all of its trouble and just serve Jesus, Moses, and Elijah.
But that was not to be, not even Jesus alone was to be served
there on the mount; he was to be served down in the wor-Ld ,
Acquiring, building, and possessing.--Peter wanted to
build; the instinct to construct was aroused. But the place
and the time for building was not "as Jesus willed." 4
English
1Cf. 1 John 1:1; see
Lexicon, p.284.
2Matt. 17:1-131'1'.
()C1.u.p. J. r c.o, Thayer's Greek
3 4
Matt. 17:4 Ibid.
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The cloud overshadowed them all. Imagine the disciples who felt
that they possessed Jesus in an unique way, that they had a
special claim on him that others did not--imagine their feel-
ing when Jesus passed from their sight into the heavenly
cloud--what a feeling of lonesomeness that must have been!
But it was only :for a f'ew moments or minutes at the most.
After the Voice spoke, the cloud passed and Jesus was lef't
ALONE, restored to the disciples, now possessed in a new and
a more unique way than bef'ore.
Self'-assertion and elation.--Impetuous Peter asserted
himself' all right, but ill-advisedly. He manifested a great
degree of elation; undoubtedly all the disciples shared his
elation to some degree. Elation in this incident is far more
evident and pronounced than the incident at Mt. Sinai. These
two illustrations have furnished the emotions contained in
love; the discussion of' them has prepared the way for a dis-
cussion of' the sentiments which they form when they blend,
that is, the secondary sentiments that make up the complex
sentiment of' love.
3. Secondary Sentiments that Blend to Form Love
Fascination.--The blending of'the emotions of f'ear
and wonder were described above1 as f'ascination. In that case
the strange object was not understood and the sentiment did not
unite with other emotions to f'orm a more complex statement.
Icr , p.:,,~22and McDougall, Soc. ~., p , 140.
SIX OF THE BLENDED EMOTIONS-l:-
Admiration Gratitude
Wonder ing
T<;;)}der
Emotion
FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3
SENTIMENT OF GRATITUDESENTIMENT OF ADMIRATION
Loathing Envy
Fear ~ ~~N~e~f"~,.tiveAnger Self-feeling
FIGURE 4 FIGURE 5
SENTIMENT OF LOATHING SENTIMENT OF ENVY
Scorn Reproach
Fear Anger
~ T~~der
Anger E'rnotion
FIGURE 6 FIGUJJRE7
SENTIMENT OF SCORN SENTIMENT OF REPROACH
1:-McDougal1,Soc. PS!., pp. 1321'1'., 1361'1'., 140, 140, 139, 141.
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For this reason fascination in its simple form is not one of
the sentiments that enter into the religious sentiment. But
it is preliminary to all religious feeling. At Mt. Sinai,
fear almost overcame wonder, and so the people wer-e dominated
largely by fear rather than by fascination. At the transfigura-
tion, fascination is lost in the sentiments of awe and reverence.
(these are discussed below).
Admiration.-- The blending of the emotions of wonder
and submissive self-feeling produces admiration (see Fig. 2)}
But there is usually tenderness blended into it also. At
Mt. Sinai, fear so dominated that there was little room for
admiration and probably no room for tenderness. After the
people had withdrawn to what to them seemed a distance of'
safety, they did stand in admiration of the wonderful pres-
ence and power of God manifested in the phenomena. At the
transfiguration, there seems to have been a considerable
amount of admiration present in the complex sentiment toward
the supernatural phenomena. The disciples not only beheld
Jesus with great admiration, but they beheld him with awe and
reverence (these are discussed below).
The sublime.--The transfiguration is probably the most
thatsublime incident,,,ever happened· on earth. How those disciples
stood enraptured! The Vlonder of it carried them away from
the world of appearance into the world of reality. No wonder
lef. McDougall, Soc. ~, pp. l32f1'.
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they wanted to remain there. Fear and submission blending
with wonder produces the sentiment of the sublime (see
Fig. 9).
Loathina.--The blending of the emotions of fear and
disgust produce the sentiment of loathing (see Fig. 4)~ A
snake is loathed by most people; this is the result of the
blending of their fear of it with their disgust for its ap-
pearance. Evil spirits are feared; the human conception of
them makes them diseusting. Those possessed by demons in
the time of Ghrist were shunned and feared. Jesus went down
2from the mountain to heal the demon-possessed epileptic boy.
On~revious occasion the Gadarene demoniac was healed.3 "A.'\
wicked man is loathsome, and cometh to shame.,,4 In contrast
to this, righteous men are always admired for their goodness.
Wonder and disGust.--Wonder unites more readily with
submissive self-reeling or meelmess; while disgust unites
more readily with assertive self-feeling or elation. There
is a sort of elated feeling that comes over a person when he
kills a snake. But there is a sort of meekness given way to
,
when a person stands in admiration of a jack-rabbit running
across the prairie; the person realizes he cannot run like
that and is meek. The very impious or wicked man is disgust-
lug, to be shunned, never to be imitated. The very pious or
lIbid., p, 140.
3
Matt. 8:28-34.
2Matt. 17:14-18.
4Prov• 13:5. (A RV).
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1righteous man is arunired and imitated.
Awe.--The blending of wonder and submissive self-
feeling produces amairation. \V.henthe emotion of fear is
blended with the sentiment of admiration, the sentiment of
. d d ( Fi 8).2 Th t' t fawe 1S pro uce see i g. e sen lmen 0 awe can be
produced in two different ways at least; all three emotions
--fear, wonder, meekness--can be excited at the same time
by the same object and, blending, produce awe; or, fear may
GOD
Reverence
(Fascinc ion)
\
"\.
-,
/
I
/
Ne tiv,/
Fea Self- /:l~ng ess~----------------~~------~~~--~~~~~~----~--~
Flight Curiosity Self-subjection Parental inst.
FIGURE 8
SENTIMENT OF REVERENCE
1
Cf. McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 58-61.
2Ibid.
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become blended with admiration after wonder and meekness
have produced it. At Mt. Sinai, the people were standing in
wonder; when the mountain began to smoke and the lightning
to flash, their wonder blended with meekness, then with fear
at the voice of God, if not before. They stood in awe be-
fore the fearful and wonderful phenomena, attributing it all
to God. Fear, wonder, and meekness blended to f'orm awe to-
ward Christ transf'igured before his disciples. The degree
to which each of the emotions is aroused determines the
strength of the sentiment; and, just as there are diff'erent
degrees of wonder, meekness, and fear, so there are different
qualities of admiration and awe.
IReverence.--As stated above, there does not seem to
have been any tenderness aroused in the people of Israel at
Mt. Sinai; if there wer e,it is hardly discernible.. So it
can hardly be said that they reverenced God upon that occasion.
For reverence is the blending of a&niration and awe with ten-
derness; without tenderness there would be no reverence (see
2
Fig. 8). At the transfiguration, the tender emotion was
present to a marked degree; it blended with awe and admira-
tion and produced reverence for Christ. Further, reverence
is often colored with gratitude, as it was on this occasion.
(Gratitude is discussed below.)
Gratitude.--~Vhen tenderness and meekness are blended
1cr , p. 73. 2Cf. McDougall,Soc. Psy.,pp.309-l5.
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1the sentiment of gratitude is formed (see Fig. 3 and 8),
but gratitude also may have elation blended into it (see
Fig. 9).2 'When the gif't comes f'rom "the giver of every good
and perf'ect gif't,,,3gratitude toward God is or should be the
result. When gratitude has elation blended into it, the sen-
timent leads to appreciation and thanksgiving. Only one of
the ten lepers willed (self'-assertion played a part) to re-
turn and give to Christ thanks f'or his bestowal of grace in
4
the act of'healing. Gratitude is f'rom man toward God f'or
grace which is possessed by man. Grace is unmerited favor
from God bestowed by him on man. At the transfiguration, how
gratef'ul the disciples TI1USthave been to receive back their
Master f'rom the overshadowing cloud. that passed over Him.
Joy.--This is a very complex sentiment classed by
McDougall as a derived emotion,5 but derived emotions are
considered in this dissertation as merely complex secondary
sentiments ..6 Some of' the emotions that blend to form it are
tenderness, elation, the satisfaction or the anticipation of
the satisfaction of' some want, and an emotion called aesthetic
. . 7pleasure for want of a better deslgnatlon.
lCf'. McDougall, Soc. Ps~., pp. 136ff.
2Cf• Holmes, Mind of'Paul, p. 109.
7-
vPHraphrase of James 1:17. 4Luke 17:11-19.
5McDougall, Outline of'Psy., pp. 343f'.
6cr , p. asrr,
7
McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp~ 155f'.
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Peace.--This is another very complex sentiment not
even mentioned by McDougall in either of his books. It seems
that no psychologist has succeeded in analyzing it. It may
bethat it is the blending of the satisfaction of some want
with a perfectly balanced blend of meekness and elation. If
this be not a satisfactory analysis, no other is proposed to
take its place. In order for a person to be at peace within"
he must have all of his conflicts within harmonized. The
person he was yesterday must be at one with the person he is
Itoday and the person he will be tomorrow. Then he will have
peace within; in short, he nmst be perfectly consistent. To
be at peace with other persons is the S~le in consciousness
as to be at peace within. The differences is that one man
has control OV0r all that is within" but he cannot have con-
trol over all that is without.
Devotion.--This complex sentiment is produced by the
blending of amniration, awe, reverence, and gratitude (see
Fig. 9).2 Awe is the sentiment toward supernatural power,
personal or impersonal, but admiration and gratitude must
have as thelr ob j ectsJ'persons; while reverence must not only
have a person as its object, but it nmst have a person that
is held as sacred or holy.. Vfuen all of these sentiments
blend, it means that the person having the sentiments has de-
voted himself to the service of the one person (monotheism).
Icr , Rom. 7. 2Holmes, Mind of Paul,p.109.
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He admires this personal god as the most sublime and tender
power to which he could submit himself in service. He is
grateful for tho tenderness, mercy, and grace of this personal
god. He rejoices because of his possession of these blessings.
He stands in awe of his god, ready to fear, wonder, and sub-
mit himself at all times. He holds his god in reverence as
sacred and holy. He desires to possess these characteristics
of his god, in order that he may be like his god. The
thought of the possibility of his acquiring them fills him
with joy and causes him to strive for them, for his ovm bene-
fi t, f'or his self-betterment. In his gratitude he is appreci-
ative and thankful for all his blessings. To a certain extent
he may feel at peace vlithin and without, but not wholly, be-
cause he does not think of his god as absolute,.-.thatis, he
does not trust him explicitly in every way. The sentiment
of devotion is the sentiment of monotheism. It is marked by
the desire of the person to serve, to give himself wholly to
his god, to devote himself completely to what is sacred and
holy.
83
.p ~{/) {/)
c.> HoP ~ {/)
CD oj ~ 0 ~.,..., <OQ) 'M 0
,D ~ S +' 'M ro0 O'M 0 +' r-l §0-1-') ~ 0Q) ~ r.:r: ..-t.,q-l-.:lo -l-.:l. t'l)Q) • §:d.-I t'l) Q ~ ...Q) {/)• • • 0 ~ S-l-.:lC\'l eo ~, 'M • ... ..-to
{/) Q) Ul~ +'Q
tI.l o Ul..o Q..-t
'M aj Q) Q)-l-.:l..... H r-lQ) tI.l {/)~
~ '"
...a eo .-I ~
;3 ro'l1 (l)'M
0 p::; {/) 4-t s:1 0 ,l:1
'M
~
I 0 ro {/) -l-.:lG-;
-l-.:l 4-t . 0
Q H E-i r-l ~ Q Ul.-l 4-t0 <D <l! <D 0 0 0) a! o 0)
U) IX. 0) ..-t 'r-! C,) s:1 Q
f!J -l-.:l tI.l .-10 -l-.:l0
aj 53 rtJ 0 {/) 'M <)'r!I ~ S Q) tI.l-l-.:l c')-l-.:l<+; E-i Q) tI.l C,) 0 •... 0
r-l tI.l S ~ ..o~
<D ... ... H 0 o Q) o C,)
(/) A ~ C,) p.. o
0 -l-.:l rtJ e s:1 (l) (l) •t!:) 'M 1=1 ... ..oro ,l:1,l:1 0)s:1 0) <D (l) • -l-.:l-l-.:l • 00 p::; 0 +' 0 (l) H {/) -l-.:l H
'M 0 •.-j '11 0 CIS(l) 0 "'0
+' IX. H .. H ttl (l),l:1 -l-.:lrtJS::
'M ~ s:1 110 Q) G-;O) (l)'M P<
tI.l C\l
~
o 0 o, .,.j H:>-l-.:l
'14 r-I 'M til rol=1 (l).-I tI.l
~ 0 ... tI.l 'M o H <+;OQ r-I
0' r=:I H H til ..c: ... ~ ;3 (l) :>.r! ::s
0 p::; (l) •.-j r-l G-; H Q ro.~ p IX. 'd 1-=1 H ~ H 'r! (l) P1tb 0 s:: ..0 0 <+; o {/) ... ..c:
H 0 ;3 <+; H G-; '14 ~tIl-l-.:l ct.1
IX. E-i ~ tI.l <D .c1 .-I-l-.:l 0
~
<D ~ <DE-! (l)~~
tI.l ... rtJ 0 :> ?<D..o 't:l~ (l) H ~ p, 0 'M S r:::
H til (l) -l-.:l I • H • . -l-.:l.r! s:: ~E-i ~ rO 'M rl ~ H s:1 O-l-.:l (l) ~
~
0 Q -l-.:l r-l 0 til ro 0 C,) s:1 ?
H 0 aj til .,.. .r-!. Q) trl p.. (l) 'M ~
(/) aj ~ H ,.q G-; b.O tIltiltlO (Q
~ tlO ro 'r-! Q) Q)
0
~
(l) ... fJ ... Q-l-.:lrl H l» Q ~'r-I . ..c: s:1 ... -l-.:l .r! ;3 <D H 0 ..-1
+' E-i 0 (l) tI.l o H .. aj ·,..1 0
0 ... 'M 0 (l) 'M Ul '<:IirtJ-l-.:l 1I~
<D IX. rO +' s:1 0) II ~ Ul Ul s:1 0 .'r-:> 0 0 ttl <D ..-t o -l-.:l'M ... 0 oj ct-t...a C!J H H S'; 0 HtIl.c1 tl'Jo 0
~ "'>! .r! (l) I b.O'I1 (l) 0 ItO'J :;: -l-.:l .8 ? .-I ib 0 (l) ... 0) +'I ffi Q (l) .-I § (l) H C\lfH Q) til H aj ;3 ;3 (l) 0)
.-t ~ rO 0 .r! ? tI.l .. ..c: <D
(l) H ~ rd 11 -l-.:l0 aj r-l-l-.:lUl(/) A <D ... ... fJ tI.lH (l) .-I0 Q H -l-.:l .r! ~ tI.l ~:::;
~ tI.l 0 <D 11"6 (l)(l)p.,-l-.:l § tI.l ..cl till H h H ? ~OM H +' s:1 0 o (l) ttl Eb 0 .r!
{/) H (l) ttl 'M 'M ct-t S H
0 +' P-t iii ? ? (l)H .r-! <D
'M 0 ro .c1(l)Q) G-;4-t..cl
H aj ttl aj rl Ul -l-.:l p.,..c: o+'
~ (l)
0 tI.l tI.l tI.l tI.l 0) til t1~ <I! <::! <I! <I! <I!
-l-.:l.s:: • • • • • • •
bD r-l C\l tI'J '<:Ii L.() ({) t--
.... 1
r-;
IX.
81
Agape' or LOVE. --The word love has been reserved to
re1'er to the sentiment called love, which is some times called
agape; and the emotions called love have been designated
tenderness and lust (in a good sense). The sentiment 01'love
is the most complex sentiment of all, unless it be hate. Love
is the sentiment 01' Christian theism. It is the sentiment
toward GOD. God is conceived 01' as a person, as loving and
all-wise, both immanent and transcendent, as Father, as
Savior through Christ, and as per1'ect--pure, holy, sacred,
absolutely good. This sentiment 01' love for God is produced
by the blending of all the emotions --all that enter into ad-
miration, gratitude, awe, reverence, devotion, etc.--all
except fear. "Perfect love casts out fear.,,2 Absolute con-
1'idence in God is necessary in order that fear be driven out
3of love. Only to the degree with which a person places
confidence in God, only to that degree does he cast out fear.
Love made perfect contains no 1'ear,4 but love not full-grovm,
imperfect love, contains a small runount of'fear. The ideal
to attain is perfect love. The diagram of the sentiment of
love for God, the Father (Fig. 9)5 gives a graphic survey of
love at a glance, but only a1'ter it has been completely under-
1cr , p , 18, 70, 72.
3Heb• 12:6; 1 Tim. 1:12; Rom. 8:2a
5Holmes, Mind of Paul, p. 109.
6IlIcDougall, SocJ~, pp. l28f.
21 John 4:18.
41 John 4:16-21.
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stood can love be seen at a glance or as a whole. Figure 10
shows the emotions common to both the sentiment of love and
the sentiment of hate. As there is no fear in perfect love,
8.0 there is no tender emotion in perfect hate, if there can
be such a sentiment as perfect hate.l
Love and hate.--These two opposing sentiments may be
studied together, because they have so many emotions in com-
mon. Each sentiment has its own object; and McDougall says
concerning the sentiments:
It is clear •••• that the objects of these two
very different sentiments may arouse many of the same
emotions, and that the two sentiments comprise emotional
dispositions that are identical, or, in other words,
that some of the emotional dispositions, or central
neuclei of the instincts, are members of sentiments
of both kinds,,2
The following figure (Fig. 10) is based on the one
SATAN GOD
FIGURE 10
3:1 'NTIMENTS OF LOVE AND HATE
D is for disgust, F for Fear, A for anger, W for
Vlonder, S for submissive self-feeling or meekness, E for
elation of assertive self-feeling, and T for tenderness.
The width of the lines indicates the degrees of strength of
the emotions excited by the objects.
1McDougall, Soc. Psy., pp. 1281'.
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by McDougall in his Social Psychology. The objects selected
i'or these two sentiments are Satan (or sin) as the object of
the sentiment of hate and God (or purity) as the object of
love. The note below the figure explains it.
Transition.--The various emotions that blend to form
the sentiments in love were noted first; then, the secondary
sentiments resulting from the blending of simple sentiments
were analyzed; and finally the more complex sentiments of
reverence, devotion, and love were analyzed. Vfuile senti-
ments contain all three elements--intellect, emotion, and
will--the emotions that blend to form love have been given
the main emphasis thus far. It is necessary to note now the
intellectual and volitional elements in the sentiments. The
intellectual elements will be noted in connection with the
study of the attitude of faith toward God. The volitional
elements will be noted in connection with the study of hope.
I
McDougall, So<;. ~, p. 129.
L
B. The Attitude of Faith toward God
Vfuat is faith?--There are three varieties of faith
1according to Pratt. If different persons were asked to de-
fine faith, there Vlould possibly be three definitions given.
One man would say it was credulity, another intellectual as-
sent, and a third emotional assent. Pratt defines faith as
"the mental attitude of assent to the reality of a given ob-
. 2
ject." This definition has been adopted, but with the in-
terpretation that it includes all three varieties of faith.
In other words, faith, largely intellectual, has both an
emotional and a volitional element in it. Faith is not an
3attitude toward the whole of religion, but only a part.
Faith in God.--Each person who loves God as his
heavenly Father believes "that he is, and that he is a re-
warder of those who seek after him. ,,4 They str-Lve to be
well-pleasing to him; in their striving for self-betterment,
they are striving to become like him, perfect. God is the
object of their faith. Through exercise of faith they develop
greater, stronger faith; through neglect their faith would
weaken and die. They keep it alive by struggling onward.
IJames Bissett Pratt, The PSYChOIOrY of ReligiousBelief (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907 , pp. 32-43.
2Ibid., p , 32.
3Of. p. 69.
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Faith and love.--In the sentiment of love, the intel-
lectual factor is dependent on faith; without faith in God,
the idea that there is a God would not be held, and there
would be no object around which to organize the sentiment.
But belief is lIsomething more than the mere presence of an
idea in the mind," as HUllleis said by Pratt to have pointed
out; !1whether or not the object of consciousness shall be an
object f belief vfill depend upon the 'manner of our conceiv-
ing,l it. The object of belief is not merely presented or
~vorl (ir-epr-asarrted , but acknowledged and accepted as a part of tne" or
reaJity.1I2 As was 'Zstated above,.:.>when only probably knowledge
is available, ju.dging is asserting what is believed and deny-
ing what is not believed. liVhenin doubt, judgment is sus-
pended. When an idea is first appears in consciousness, it
may be merely credible; then after reasoning about it, it may
be given intellectual assent as a truth; but when an emotional
content is added to it, it is accepted with emotional assent,
that is with feeling--sometimes very strong feeling. In the
latter case it becomes a sentiment, but faith is always more
intellectual than emotional. The more faith a person has
the more he is inclined to act accordingly.
I
Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Selby-Bigge's ed.),
p. 96, quoted by Pratt, Psy. of ReI., Belief,pp. 32f.
2Pratt, Psy. of ReI. Belief, p. 32ff.
3Cf• p. 14.
c. The Attitude o~ Hope in God
What is ho~?--McDougall calls it a derived emotion.l
As was stated above,2 these so-called derived emotions that
McDougall differentiates from blended emotions or ~entiments
are considered as secondary sentiments and as being formed in
the same way as secondary or blended emotions are. McDougall
bor-r-owsMa j or-Priestly's excellent illustration of hope.
Explorers in the Arctics experience almost the whole ganut
o~ derived emotions in their experience of trying to get back
to where they can obtain food. From confidence they go to hope,
~rom hope to anxiety, to despondency, and to despair; then to
regret, remorse, sorrow, chagrin, and ~inally to grief. I~ faith
were added to this list, it would come at the first--thus, ~aith
confidonce, hope, etc. No attempt has been made here to analyze
hope.
Faith and ho~2..£.--The more uncertainty there is put in-
to ~aith, the weaker it becomes; hope is sometimes so strong
that it is almost ~aith. But there is a certain measure of
uncertainty about the thing believed. When a person seems a-
bout to triumph over this uncertainty, he has hope. Hope is
~aith weakened by having varying degrees of uncertainty mixed
into it. People hope that there is a hereafter and that they
are not m lst alcen in believing that God helps them in their
striving ~or sel~-betterment. The stronger hope is, the stronger
the will is.
IMcDougall, Outline of PsX., pp.338-343. 2Cf• p.23f.
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Summary
There is no particular instinct (or instincts) that is .
peculiar to man, which the animals do not have, :from which re-
~igion s9rings• Religion is not innately given even in its
eimplest :forms; it is acquired by .forming sentiments around
ood as their object. These sentiments are organized into one
complex sentLnent, which is called the religious sentiment in
this dissertation, because of its object and its nature.
This religious sentiment or attitude may be first
~alyzed into .faith, hope and love, and since the greatest of
these is love, it was discussed in great detail. Very short
sections were given to faith and hope because the religious
sentiment is largely composed o.f love. Love is defined as
I'intelligent good will." Faith is largely intellectual; hope
is almost wh.oLl.y emotional; and love is composed of'all three
with the emotional most prominent.
Admiration, awe, and reverence are the prevailing
sentiments in the religious li.fe.l Fascination is the senti-
ment pr.eliminarl to all religious .feeling; admiration and
disgust (loathing) are the prevailing sentiments toward good
and evil spirits respectively, marking the beginning of reli-
gious feeling; awe is the first real religious f'eeling; and
1McDougall, Soc. PSY., PP* 309-315.
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reverence is the religious sentiment par excellence,l because
it is the sentiment toward the Sacred, the Holy. Devotion is
the sentiment proper to monotheism. Love is the sentiment
o~ Christian theism, the sentiment toward GOD.
1
Ibid., p. 136.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Purpose. of this chapter.--'.rhe intention of this
chapter is to summarize the whole study wi th the view of
giving a bird's eye view of what has been done.
Person.--A man is a self-conscious, self-directlng
organism; he is composed of spirit, mind, and body, he (Adam)
originated by creation; each man is now developing toward
moral perfection through devotion to his o~m self-betterment.
lund. -- The mind of a man is a unit of spiritual acti-
vity; it is analyzed into interacting processes--thinking,
feeling. and 'willing; each of these is analyzed into processes.
Sentiments. --These are colonies of emotional disposi-
tions organized about persons, things, and ideas. There are
three main classes of Sentiments: sentiments of love, hat~,
and respect; there are two subspecies: egoism (sentiments
t owar-d self) and altruism lsentiments toward others). Eaoh
sentiment contains intellectual, emotional, and volitional
factors. Tb ese sentiments ari se in consciousness vii th the
contemplation of the object and grow through education and
through experience in struggling toward self-betterment. They
must be cultivated or they will be crowded out like crops are
taken by wee ds, 'T>neymake up oriet s character and determine
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one's conduct. A man is judged by his conduct; he can be
judged by his sentiments also.
Religious person~r-They are one variety of persons.
A religious person is distinguished from all other persons
by the fact that he invokes the aid of a superhtunan being in
his striving for self-betterment. This superhuman being be-
comes the object around which he organizes all of his senti-
ments. For the Christian God is the object of all of his
sentiments.
Religion.--The religious person's religion does not
spring from one faculty of his mind, but it involves his whole
mind--nisthinking, feeling, and willing. Mind, life, and
religion are synonymous terms for the functions of the reli-
gious man.
The religious sentiment.--This is an organized system
comprising all of the sentiments of a religious person that
have God as their object. They are all unified by their or-
ganization about one object. The religious sentiment is the
whole attitude of a religious person toward God and all that
pertains to God. This attitude is made up of faith, hope,
and love, and "the greatest of these is love," or lIintelligent
good vdll. II
Finally: this dissertation has shown how sentiments
are formed; that religion includes the whole man; and that
the religious man's sentiments toward God form one process or
activity centered around God, who is evoked for aid in his
striving to become perfect like God--to the glory of God.
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